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ABSTRACT
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable “searches
and seizures,” but in the digital age of stingray devices and IP
tracking, what constitutes a search or seizure? The Supreme Court has
held that the threshold question depends on and reflects the
“reasonable expectations” of ordinary members of the public
concerning their own privacy. For example, the police now exploit the
“third party” doctrine to access data held by email and cell phone
providers, without securing a warrant, on the Supreme Court’s
intuition that the public has no expectation of privacy in that
information. Is that assumption correct? If judges’ intuitions about
privacy do not reflect actual public expectations, it may undermine the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, exacerbate social unrest, and
produce unjust outcomes.
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Although prior research has shown that the police
disproportionately target younger people and minority communities,
judges tend to be male, white, educated, affluent, and older than the
general population. Their intuitions may thus be systematically
different. Even worse, cognitive science suggests that judges may have
difficulty putting themselves into the shoes of the searched person or
considering the reasonableness of the police tactics from an ex ante
perspective, without knowledge about the fruits of the search.
With 1,200 respondents, we conducted a large-scale survey
experiment to test whether—and if so, why—contemporary Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence diverges from the societal norms it purports
to protect and reflect. We identify a range of privacy expectations for
eighteen different police practices. We use oversampling, reweighting,
and randomization to demonstrate that there is disparity between
judicial and public expectations and investigate the particular causes.
In close cases, these disparities are sufficiently large that the Court
may be drawing conclusions that conflict with the views of ordinary
citizens. We conclude by suggesting better ways forward, so that social
science evidence can replace judicial speculation.
“[J]udges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those
of the hypothetical reasonable person. . . .”
Justice Samuel Alito1
“Although constitutional law is riddled with empirical judgments, this
fact seems to be lost on most constitutional law scholars.”
Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman, and Geoffrey R. Stone2
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional law routinely rests “on some sort of empirical assertion.”3
Yet all too often those assertions are based not on reliable empirical data, but
rather on judges’ intuitions and sheer speculations. The Fourth Amendment is a
prominent example. The Supreme Court’s threshold definition of “searches and
seizures,” to which the Fourth Amendment applies, turns on the “reasonable
expectations” of ordinary members of the public. The Supreme Court has,
however, developed Fourth Amendment doctrine without drawing on data about

3.

See id. at 1009.

266

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:263

the actual beliefs of those people. The Court implicitly instructs the federal and
state judiciaries—which together tend to be male, white, educated, affluent,
older, and less frequently searched—to speculate about how other Americans
actually experience police practices. The result is that contemporary Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence diverges substantially from the societal norms it
purports to protect and reflect. Such a divergence may undermine the legitimacy
of the judiciary and exacerbate social unrest.4
This Article fills an important part of the empirical gap in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. We conducted a robust empirical study of the views
of members of the public on “reasonable expectations of privacy” to inform
judicial decisions about whether police conduct constitutes a search.5
Concomitantly, whether police conduct constitutes a seizure turns upon
reasonable expectations of privacy, liberty, and autonomy.6 Therefore, “if one
takes the Justices at their word, a sense of how (innocent) U.S. citizens gauge the
impact of police investigative techniques on their privacy and autonomy is highly
relevant to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”7
We recruited a diverse sample of 1,200 individuals to determine their views
on various police investigative practices. We presented the respondents with a
set of scenarios and asked them whether the police actions violated their
reasonable expectations of privacy. These scenarios reflect police tactics that
have already been the subject of Supreme Court review as well as emerging
tactics that rely upon new technologies. We suspected that results from the
former scenarios would show that the Supreme Court’s doctrine does not
correspond to the views of ordinary members of the public, while results for the
latter could help courts address emerging police tactics.
Our data confirm our suspicions. Both the Supreme Court and lower courts
substantially underestimate the extent to which ordinary individuals perceive
police practices to infringe upon their expectations of privacy and autonomy.
This is especially the case in the scenarios involving the application of the “third
party” doctrine to police access to new technology, such as smartphones and the
internet.8 Scenarios that, under the third party doctrine, would not constitute a

4. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008); Tom R. Tyler &
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance,
Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014) (discussing the role that
institutional legitimacy plays in achieving public compliance with the law).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the warrantless use of a listening
device was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment).
6. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) (describing a seizure as an “intrusion
upon that person’s liberty or privacy”).
7. See also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
8. The third party doctrine states that there is “no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’” in
“information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.” United States
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search or seizure were treated by our survey respondents as more intrusive than
those the Court considers the most intrusive and requiring the most stringent
justification.9 We therefore argue that when the Supreme Court is called to rule
upon these new investigative techniques, the Court should refuse to apply the
third party doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court has the opportunity do just that
in Carpenter v. United States, which is currently pending before the Court.10
Other cases also involving technology searches similar to the scenarios we tested
are sure to follow quickly on Carpenter’s heels.11
Importantly, our study also examined why judicial doctrine diverges from
societal views of privacy and autonomy. We applied an innovative experimental
design that allowed us to assess whether first person and outcome biases affect
people’s views of whether police conduct violates their reasonable expectations
of privacy and autonomy. We tested for these biases by manipulating the
perspective of the survey respondent (whether the respondent was the searched
person or an observer) and whether the participants were told that the search
revealed incriminating evidence. We also enriched our sample to explore the
potential for racialized perceptions of government legitimacy in this sensitive
law enforcement domain, a nuance that may not be fully captured by the
speculations of a less-diverse judiciary.
We have five primary findings relevant to law and policy. First and most
importantly, in general, the U.S. public has greater concerns for privacy than are
reflected in current judicial doctrine. Second, current judicial doctrine includes
several relative judgments—e.g., giving no protection to emails held by an
internet provider, but absolute protection to a bedroom—that do not reflect actual
expectations of privacy in the United States. Third, the ubiquitous practice of
judgment in hindsight (i.e., with knowledge that a search has found evidence of
crime) strongly decreases the likelihood that people will find violations of
reasonable expectations or privacy. Fourth, the pervasive practice of developing
Fourth Amendment doctrine through criminal defendants’ suppression motions
(in the third person) also decreases the likelihood of finding a violation. Fifth,
whites and older persons (beyond age 41)—such as those who dominate the U.S.
state and federal judiciary—are less likely to find that police investigative
practices invade privacy.
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); see also Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for ThirdParty Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009) (discussing
various arguments both for and against the third party doctrine).
9. See infra Part V(B) for a comparison of our results to the Supreme Court’s holdings.
10. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402). The question as presented by the petitioner is “[w]hether the warrantless
seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone
user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at i, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (U.S. argued Nov. 29, 2017).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __ S. Ct.
___ (Jan. 8, 2018) (No. 17-5126), 2018 WL 311442 (Mem) (challenging the constitutionality of using
information gathered pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act against U.S. citizens).
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Our Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the legal background of
reasonable expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III
argues that the Supreme Court’s reasonable expectations of privacy analysis
purportedly adopts the first person perspective of an innocent suspect, reflective
of ordinary members of the public. This Part then reviews prior empirical studies
that suggest problems with the implementation of this doctrine. Part IV describes
the methodology of our study, Part V reports our findings, and Part VI describes
the study’s limitations and our recommendations.
I.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment
From the outset, it is crucial to distinguish between the separate roles that
different conceptions of “reasonableness” play in Fourth Amendment doctrine.
One role comes from the text of the constitutional provision. The Fourth
Amendment provided in part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.”12 But what government conduct constitutes a “search” or
“seizure”? Only government conduct that is determined to be a search or seizure
must not be “unreasonable.”
Second, and more fundamentally, the Supreme Court has also defined
“searches and seizures”—the threshold question of whether the Fourth
Amendment applies—by reference to reasonableness. Government conduct
constitutes a search when it violates “reasonable expectations of privacy”13 and
constitutes a seizure when it intrudes upon reasonable expectations of
autonomy.14
Our study addresses this latter threshold conception of reasonableness
underpinning the definition of searches and seizures. As we argue in more detail
below, the Supreme Court has repeatedly—and explicitly—asserted that
“reasonableness” in this context is determined by the beliefs of the typical
innocent member of society who is subjected to the potential search or seizure.15
The beliefs of such members of society are therefore directly relevant to the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s decisions on whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to various forms of police investigation, making this a particularly ripe
issue for empirical study.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (“[A] violation occurs when government officers violate
a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”).
14. See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 732 (“The Court’s seizure
cases[‘] . . . repeated use of the ‘reasonable person’ rubric suggests a similar reliance on what the average
citizen would feel with respect to restraints on freedom of action.”).
15. See infra Part III(A).
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B. The Definition of Searches and Seizures
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of searches and seizures expanded in
the twentieth century. In the early case of Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme
Court defined government searches solely by reference to violations of property
interests, such that wiretapping telephone lines did not constitute a search since
the wiretaps “were made without trespass upon any property of the
defendants.”16 However, in the seminal case Katz v. United States, the Court
shifted the focus of its Fourth Amendment analysis from property to privacy.
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart asserted that this was because “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”17 Therefore, “what a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”18
Justice Harlan’s concurrence provided an influential framework. Justice
Harlan described “a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”19
The concept of reasonable expectations of privacy has been the foundation
of Fourth Amendment analysis in the four decades since Katz was decided.20
While the Court recently resurrected the property conception of a search in
United States v. Jones, it did so in a manner that supplemented rather than
supplanted the privacy conception.21 That is, Jones held that Katz had extended,
rather than repudiated, the Fourth Amendment protections afforded under the
property rubric. Post-Katz, a search occurred when government agents intruded
upon either property interests or reasonable expectations of privacy.22
In Jones, government agents installed a GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage of a vehicle and tracked the vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight
days.23 The Court held that the installation of the GPS device on the vehicle was
a search because “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the

16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928).
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
18. Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
19. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no privacy in trash left on curb for
collection); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (no privacy in private property outside the
curtilage of a home); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (no privacy in contents of a box
previously opened by a private party); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no privacy in bank
records); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (no privacy in information told to an informant).
21. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
22. Id. at 406 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a
particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it
enumerates. . . . ’[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons
and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment
extends to the home . . . .’”) (alterations in original).
23. Id. at 403.
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purpose of obtaining information.”24 By basing its conclusion on property
intrusion, the Court sidestepped the crucial but complicated question of whether
using a GPS device to track the location of a vehicle on public streets for such
an extended time period was a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy.25
Nevertheless, the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy remains
the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis in the wake of Jones. The
reasonable expectations of privacy analysis will be especially important when
courts address techniques for obtaining information using new technologies, as
these will rarely involve physical intrusions into constitutionally protected areas.
The Court’s definition of a seizure employs a parallel conception of
reasonableness. United States v. Mendenhall26 established that “a person has
been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.”27 The Mendenhall Court looked to
whether the citizen who is questioned “remains free to disregard the questions
and walk away,” and, if he or she is able to do so, then “there has been no
intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy.”28 Numerous cases have adopted
this reasonableness test for whether police conduct constitutes a seizure.29 As

24. Id. at 404.
25. The question the Court avoided answering is precisely one of the scenarios we tested in our
empirical study. It is also important to note that two of the concurring opinions did address the question
of whether GPS tracking of a vehicle for twenty-eight days violated reasonable expectations of privacy,
in important but different ways. Justice Alito applied what is described in the literature as “mosaic
theory” to argue that surveillance for such an extended use of time constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search. Id. at 431. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth
Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1809 (2014); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A
Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations
of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 205 (2015); Christine
S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal
Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2015). In her concurring opinion,
Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito that longer-term GPS monitoring constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. Jones, 565 U.S. at 955. But Justice Sotomayor also called into question the
constitutionality of “even short-term monitoring,” id. at 415, and proposed that “[m]ore fundamentally,
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” id. at 417. We address this suggestion in greater
detail Part I.C below.
26. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
27. Id. at 554.
28. Id. at 554, 546.
29. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (expressly applying Mendenhall);
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 195 (2002) (applying a “reasonable person” standard to
determine whether a seizure occurred); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 424 (1991) (same); California
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (“Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a “show
of authority” is an objective one . . . .”); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988) (“[A]ny
assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure . . . must take into account ‘all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident . . . .’”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Florida v. Royer, 460
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other scholars have pointed out, “[w]hile [the seizure cases] do not rely on
community values as explicitly as the search cases do, their repeated use of the
‘reasonable person’ rubric suggests a similar reliance on what the average citizen
would feel with respect to restraints on freedom of action.”30 Similarly, the
seizure cases’ repeated description of seizures as intrusions on privacy
demonstrates that the Court considers (or purports to consider) societal beliefs
about privacy in both the search and seizure contexts.31
C. The Third Party Doctrine
The Supreme Court has developed a number of doctrinal rules that
purportedly derive from reasonable expectations of privacy. One of these rules
is the third party doctrine, which states that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information that has been voluntarily disclosed to any
third party.
In United States v. Miller,32 for example, the Court held that individuals do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in checks, deposit slips, and other
documents provided to their bank. These documents contained “only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary
course of business.”33 The Miller Court based this rule on its understanding of
when it is reasonable or legitimate for a person to expect information to remain
private. The Court declared that “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the

U.S. 491, 503 n.9 (1983) (internal citation omitted) (“Our decision here is consistent with the Court’s
judgment in United States v. Mendenhall.”).
30. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 732.
31. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 52 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (describing roadblock seizures of automobiles as involving “only minimal intrusion on the
privacy of their occupants” and stating “[i]t is the objective effect of the State’s actions on the privacy
of the individual that animates the Fourth Amendment”); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (quoting Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 439 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988)) (stating that the test for whether a sobriety checkpoint was a valid seizure required
balancing the state’s interests against “the level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the
checkpoints”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514–15 (1983) (explaining that determining whether “a
seizure less intrusive than a formal arrest” complies with the Fourth Amendment “requires balancing
the amount of intrusion upon individual privacy against the special law enforcement interests”);
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697–98 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
209 (1979)) (explaining that “the intrusion on the citizen’s privacy” in many special needs seizures “‘was
so much less severe’ than that involved in a traditional arrest”); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (describing
a seizure as an “intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)
(stating that a “central concern [of the Court’s seizure cases] has been to assure that an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions”); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213
(referring to “[t]he central importance of the probable-cause requirement [for arrest] to the protection of
a citizen’s privacy”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (describing a temporary seizure of Terry as
“interrupt[ing] Terry’s freedom of movement and invad[ing] his privacy”).
32. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that individuals do not possess a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information given to a bank).
33. Id. at 442.
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Government.”34 This is true “even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”35
The third party doctrine has suffered substantial academic and judicial
criticisms, especially in light of the profound extent to which we “voluntarily”
convey information to third parties in the digital age. For example, in United
States v. Jones,36 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence called for a wholesale
reconsideration of “the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”37
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course
of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that
they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and
the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to
online retailers . . . I for one doubt that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every
Web site they visited in the last week, or month, or year.38
Our empirical study gathers data on precisely the questions about which
Justice Sotomayor postulated: whether people would consider it reasonable to
expect privacy in information provided to internet service providers, cell phone
companies, website operators, and so on.
Many of the questions about whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the context of these new technologies remain unresolved by the
Supreme Court.39 The lower courts have also split on whether the collection of
historical cell site data, which police can use to approximate a person’s
movements over periods of time, violates reasonable expectations of privacy.40
Arguably, whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to such technologies is the most important contemporary question in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.41 The results of our study will therefore
provide a resource for courts and suggest how the Supreme Court should resolve
34. Id. at 443.
35. Id.
36. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
37. Id. at 417.
38. Id. at 417–18.
39. Id. at 413 (expressly declining to decide whether GPS tracking violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy in one’s movement on public roads).
40. Compare United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that obtaining cell
site location information is a search requiring probable cause and a warrant), with United States v. Davis,
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding
that obtaining cell site location information is not a search requiring probable cause and a warrant).
41. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion, Automated Suspicion, Big
Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 18 (2016) (“[C]urrent unresolved issues of police
technology have focused on whether a particular use is a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant
and probable cause.”).
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these issues when, inevitably, it is called upon to do so. In contrast, earlier studies
tested community members’ opinions on scenarios on which the Supreme Court
had already ruled.42 Our study is therefore uniquely valuable as a prospective
guide for the Supreme Court when it wrestles with these issues in the near future.
D. The Case for Reasonableness as Ordinary Beliefs
To evaluate a given police practice—whether in the third party context or
more generally—we join a longstanding and growing chorus of scholars who
call for empirical study of actual contemporary social norms and understandings.
A quarter-century ago, Slobogin and Schumacher made a ground-breaking study
of public attitudes to government searches.43 They pointed primarily to Rakas v.
Illinois44 as support for the proposition that empirical study could be helpful.45
In Rakas, the Court asserted that “[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by
law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.”46 This language, together with the
language in which Justice Harlan stated the second prong of the “search” test in
Katz, suggests that it is society’s beliefs and expectations that determine the
scope of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
This conception of reasonable expectations of privacy is supported by a
slew of other Supreme Court decisions. For example, the Court held in Kyllo v.
United States that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the home’s interior that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ . . . constitutes
a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use.”47 The Court’s caveat—that government use of technology is not a
Fourth Amendment search if the technology is in general public use—only
makes sense if the definition of a search is meant to encapsulate actual social
beliefs and expectations, shaped by social practices outside the context of police
investigations.
The Court took a similar approach in cases addressing whether aerial
surveillance of the backyard of a person’s house constitutes a search. In
California v. Ciraolo,48 the Court referred to societal expectations to justify its
holding that police inspection from a fixed-wing aircraft in navigable airspace
did not violate reasonable expectations of privacy.49 The Court reasoned that it
42. See infra Part II.
43. Slobogin & Schumacher supra note 7, at 731 (describing “the Court’s willingness to rely on
societal understandings in defining ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’”).
44. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
45. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 731.
46. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (emphasis added).
47. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
48. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
49. Id. at 214.
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was not reasonable to expect privacy in an area that anyone could view by legally
flying over it.50 Given that “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace
who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed,”51
the Court “readily conclude[d] that respondent’s expectation that his garden was
protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that
society is prepared to honor.”52 The Court emphasized that the Katz test
incorporates the actual beliefs and expectations of members of society by
asserting that “Justice Harlan made it crystal clear that he was resting on the
reality that one who enters a telephone booth is entitled to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted.”53 The Court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy “in an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine.”54
Three years later in Florida v. Riley,55 the Court applied the same approach
to helicopter surveillance from the lower altitude of four hundred feet. The Court
asserted that “‘private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public airways
is routine’ in this country” and pointed out that “helicopters are not bound by the
lower limits of the navigable airspace allowed to other aircraft.”56 Therefore,
“[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley’s property
in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s
greenhouse. The police officer did no more.”57
The Supreme Court has also purported to rely on actual social norms and
understanding when addressing two different aspects of what constitutes a search
of a person’s house. The first aspect involves situations in which a person other
than the suspect gives the government investigator permission to enter the
premises. The second aspect relates to determining whether entry onto a person’s
curtilage constitutes a trespass and is therefore a search.
The first aspect is evident in Georgia v. Randolph, where the Court
surveyed its prior decisions on consent to enter and concluded that:
The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness
in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely

50. Id.
51. Id. at 213–14.
52. Id. at 214.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 215.
55. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
56. Id. at 450–51.
57. Id. at 451. We do not offer these examples to endorse the Court’s conclusions about what
societal expectations actually are—such as the Court’s bare assertion that “any member of the public”
could have been flying a helicopter over the defendant’s backyard, and therefore it is unreasonable to
expect privacy in one’s backyard, even when the backyard is shielded from prying eyes at ground level
or from nearby structures. Id. Indeed, the whole point of our empirical study is to assess quantitatively
the accuracy of Court’s assumptions and intuitions about social realities. The point of these examples is
to show that the Court is clearly purporting to draw on the “reality” of social expectations in determining
what counts as reasonable.
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shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by
the law of property, but not controlled by its rules.58
The Court continued:
[Our prior decisions] not only hold[] that a solitary co-inhabitant may
sometimes consent to a search of shared premises, but stands for the
proposition that the reasonableness of such a search is in significant part
a function of commonly held understanding about the authority that coinhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.59
In Randolph, the Court applied this approach to a situation in which the
suspect has expressly refused permission to enter, but a co-occupant has given
permission. Entry in this situation constitutes a search, because:
[A] caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no
confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason
to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.” Without
some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those
conditions. . . . Unless the people living together fall within some
recognized hierarchy, like a household of parent and child or barracks
housing military personnel of different grades, there is no societal
understanding of superior and inferior.”60
Recently, the Court relied on social norms and widely held understandings
in a second way, namely to determine when physical entry onto the curtilage was
a Fourth Amendment search. In Florida v. Jardines,61 a police officer took a
drug-sniffing dog onto the defendant’s front porch, where it explored back and
forth and sniffed under the front door. The Supreme Court noted that while the
porch was part of the curtilage and therefore constitutionally protected, “[a]
license [to enter] may be implied from the habits of the country.”62 What is
reasonable for a police officer, the Court held, turns on the commonly held
understanding of members of society:
Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require
fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident
by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer
not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely
because that is “no more than any private citizen might do.”63
But this license, the Court decided, does not extend to “introducing a
trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering
incriminating evidence. . . . There is no customary invitation to do that. An

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 113–14 (emphasis added).
569 U.S. 1 (2013).
Id. at 8.
Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)).
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invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in
the very act of hanging a knocker.”64
It is quite instructive for the purposes of our study to note the points of
agreement and disagreement between the majority and dissent in Jardines. Both
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent accepted the
importance of widely shared community norms; however, they disagreed about
the content of these norms. Justice Scalia wrote:
With this much, the dissent seems to agree—it would inquire into the
appearance of things, what is typical for a visitor, what might cause
alarm to a resident of the premises, what is expected of ordinary visitors,
and what would be expected from a reasonably respectful citizen. These
are good questions. But their answers are incompatible with the
dissent’s outcome, which is presumably why the dissent does not even
try to argue that it would be customary, usual, reasonable, respectful,
ordinary, typical, nonalarming, etc., for a stranger to explore the
curtilage of the home with trained drug dogs.65
Of course, the majority opinion likewise offered little support for its
contrary conclusion. Both justices relied on their intuitions and assumptions
about what is customary or usual, and about what a reasonable, respectful, typical
person would consider appropriate behavior when approaching a home. Neither
Justice Scalia nor Justice Alito made any attempt to refer to some external,
objective basis for their assertions about what is reasonable; both placed blind
reliance on the notion that they were accurate barometers of the public at large
and that their gut instincts were commensurate with those of the general
population. It is precisely this void that survey data like ours can fill.
These Supreme Court opinions support the proposition that empirical
evidence of whether “contemporary, ordinary Americans expect privacy in a
particular context”66 is relevant to whether government investigators have
conducted a search.67 In an excellent recent article, Matthew Kugler and Lior
Strahilevitz described this approach as the most natural reading of the Katz
reasonable expectations of privacy test: “The most obvious approach would
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 8 n.2. (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
66. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 220.
67. For an excellent extended discussion of the role of community expectations in deciding
whether the government is conducting a search, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING
WITHOUT PERMISSION, at ch. 9 (2017). Friedman casts the Katz test specifically in terms of social
convention or social norms. He argues that “Katz can be read as making social convention determinative
of when we have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In other words, one interpretation of the Katz
decision is that whether the government is conducting a ‘search’ . . . properly rests on societal norms
about when we all ought to be able to expect to have our privacy respected.” Id. at 225. While we tested
individual beliefs rather than social convention, the former presumably inform the latter—and vice
versa. As Friedman notes, “[t]echnology is invariably going to shift the way we interact with one
another, and what our expectations of appropriate social behavior are. The law must be concerned with
how people understand their privacy in the world in which we actually live. And it is to those
expectations that law enforcement must adhere.” Id. at 226.
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be . . . to ask a representative sample of Americans such questions directly.”68
But there is in fact a serious dispute among both jurists and scholars as to whether
it is appropriate to consult survey data in determining the content of people’s
reasonable expectations of privacy. The most prominent contrary voice in the
academy is that of Orin Kerr, who has argued that courts often resolve Katz
questions without purporting to reflect what ordinary Americans believe or
expect in particular contexts.69
Kerr argued that the Supreme Court has not “settle[d] on a single test for
what makes an expectation of privacy ‘reasonable.’”70 Indeed, “Supreme Court
opinions cannot even agree on what kind of test it is. Is it descriptive? Is it
normative? Just what does it measure? The cases are all over the map, and the
Justices have declined to resolve the confusion.”71 Kerr pointed out that to most
scholars, the failure to elucidate a general test “is widely considered an
embarrassment.”72 To Kerr, however, the lack of a grand unified theory is a
feature, not a bug; it is a strength of Fourth Amendment doctrine rather than a
weakness. “The Supreme Court,” Kerr argued, “has not and cannot adopt a single
test for when an expectation is ‘reasonable’ because no one test effectively and
consistently distinguishes the more troublesome police practices that require
Fourth Amendment scrutiny from the less troublesome practices that do not.”73
This is because “the facts of police investigations prove too diverse; no one
measurement accurately draws the line in all cases.”74
Kerr argued that, from a descriptive standpoint, “[a]lthough the courts
speak of a single ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, the one label masks
several distinct but coexisting approaches.”75 Kerr described these coexisting
approaches as “four models” of Fourth Amendment protection, and contends that
only one model (what he refers to as the probabilistic model) involves the actual
expectations of privacy of ordinary citizens.76 Kerr consequently criticized the
use of survey data in the Fourth Amendment context.77 Slobogin has, however,

68. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 228.
69. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
504 (2007) (asserting that the Supreme Court has not established a standard for “what makes an
expectation of privacy constitutionally ‘reasonable’”).
70. Id. at 505.
71. Id. (emphasis omitted).
72. Id. Kerr noted that among scholars, “[t]he Court’s handiwork has been condemned as
‘distressingly unmanageable,’ ‘unstable,’ and ‘a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that [the Court]
has left entirely undefended.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
73. Id. at 506.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 508.
77. See Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951 (2009).
Kugler and Strahilevitz neatly summarized these concerns as “whether courts have the capacity to assess
popular attitudes, whether popular attitudes will fluctuate wildly from day to day, why the content of
constitutional provisions should hinge on those attitudes as opposed to doctrines grounded in prior
constitutional and property-related precedents, and whether popular attitudes about complicated legal
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responded that, upon deeper inspection, each of Kerr’s four models collapses
into an assessment of intrusiveness78—precisely the question Slobogin explored
in his survey of public attitudes and precisely the question we explore in the
present study.
Kugler and Strahilevitz have provided several additional arguments. First,
they pointed out that Kerr’s four models predate Jones and argued that Jones
itself seems to reject, at least provisionally and implicitly, some of Kerr’s
arguments.79 More fundamentally, Kugler and Strahilevitz have rejected the
desirability of the Court having different models from which to pick and choose,
“because this approach creates an undue risk of doctrinal incoherence and
unpredictability.”80 Kugler and Strahilevitz argued, moreover, that it is
“normatively desirable” to base a unitary test for reasonable expectations of
privacy on empirical data. They argued that:
The Fourth Amendment is designed to safeguard individuals against
governmental overreach. When there is a sharp divide between what the
courts describe as the Fourth Amendment’s scope and what the people
actually expect the Fourth Amendment’s scope to be, various problems
arise. Law-abiding people may take excessive precautions to protect
their information, keeping it not only from the state’s agents but also
from third parties who could put the information to productive uses. Or
citizens might make inordinate investments in learning the contours of
Fourth Amendment law, time and money that could be better spent
elsewhere. Also, mistaken expectations limit the effectiveness of the
democratic process as a check on law enforcement surveillance; the
public may not move legislatively to protect privacy if they mistakenly
believe it is already protected constitutionally. Disconnects between
actual law and perceived law may also provide police officers and
prosecutors with undue leverage over citizens.81

and technological issues are meaningful.” Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 234. In a more recent
study, Kugler & Strahilevitz have shown that attitudes on privacy remain relatively stable in response to
a new Supreme Court decision. See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth
Amendment Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747 (2018). Moreover, in Section V.B, our own study
broadly replicated Slobogin and Schumacher’s results on “traditional police practices” conducted almost
a quarter of a century earlier. These results suggest that concerns about wildly fluctuating attitudes are
not well founded.
78. Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and
Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1603–04 (2010).
79. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 222 (“Jones itself removes the ‘positive law’ model
from the Katz framework. . . .”).
80. Id. at 222.
81. Id. at 227. Kugler and Strahilevitz’s concern about police officers leveraging citizens’
confusion or ignorance of the applicable law has already been recognized as a problem with respect to
consent searches. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 277, 284–85 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s conclusion that police officers need not inform a person they
can decline to consent to search and arguing that “consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice
unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194, 208, 211–12 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s conclusion that passengers
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We share many of these normative concerns, especially in the realm of
emergent technology, social media, and the new (sometimes semi-public) forms
that personal communication now take as a result. We find consensus in at least
one of Kerr’s models—namely the probabilistic model, which requires judges to
apply the actual expectations of society. If judges and justices are doing so, and
that is normatively desirable, surely it is better that their conclusions be
accurate—based on robust empirical data—than limited by their own hunches.
II.
EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND BACKGROUND
In the previous section, we explained that the threshold question in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence—whether police conduct constitutes a search or
seizure—turns on whether the conduct violates a person’s reasonable
expectations of privacy or autonomy. Further, we argued that when the Court
refers to reasonable expectations about privacy and autonomy, it does or should
refer to societal norms or beliefs, which raises the empirical questions we test
herein.
In this Part, we explore potential biases and distortions that may make it
difficult for judges to perform accurately the task of assessing societal
expectations of privacy. Whether they succeed is the empirical question we test
below. We also review the prior empirical literature that attempts to quantify
those social expectations.
A. The Innocent Person Being Searched versus Hindsight Bias
Here, we sharpen the doctrinal question in the definition of searches and
seizures to focus on the perspective of an innocent person who is the subject of
the potential search or seizure. While the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
declares that reasonable expectations of privacy be judged from the perspective
of an innocent person, in practice those assessments are typically made in
hindsight in the context of suppression hearings or after the accused has been
found guilty. Our empirical study then asks whether making decisions in these
contexts might distort the results so that they do not reflect the outcomes that we
would expect if decisions were truly made from the perspective of an innocent
person.
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental pillar of the criminal justice
system.82 Accordingly, if the police find incriminating evidence, the success of
that search cannot itself inform the question of whether the search was proper.

on a bus were not seized and consented to being searched, because “[t]he reasonable inference was that
the ‘interdiction’ was not a consensual exercise, but one the police would carry out whatever the
circumstances; that they would prefer ‘cooperation’ but would not let the lack of it stand in their way”).
82. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); James Bradley Thayer, The
Presumption of Innocence in Criminal Cases, 6 YALE L.J. 185, 188–89 (1896).
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After all, “[t]he Fourth Amendment aims to protect the privacy of all individuals
against government intrusion.”83
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that there is
no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in criminal conduct or
contraband. For example, in Rakas v. Illinois,84 the Court stated that:
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may
have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is
not one which the law recognizes as “legitimate.” His presence . . . is
“wrongful”; his expectation is not “one that society is prepared to
recognize as “reasonable.”85
Similarly, the Court has stated on several occasions that investigative
techniques that only indicate the presence of contraband substances do not
violate any reasonable expectations of privacy. The Court on this basis has held
that a trained narcotics detection dog performing a “sniff test” of luggage does
not violate the luggage owner’s reasonable expectations of privacy, and therefore
is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.86 The Court explained that:
A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog . . . does not
require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband [sic]
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for
example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage.
. . . Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item. . . . This limited disclosure also ensures
that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive
investigative methods.87
The Court has applied this logic to the use of drug detection dogs to
determine the presence of illegal drugs in cars.88 The Court also used the same
reasoning in United States v. Jacobsen89 to hold that a field chemical test for
narcotics was not a Fourth Amendment search. The Court reasoned:
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy . . . [V]irtually all of the tests conducted . . . would result in a
83. Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1 (2013).
84. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
85. Id. at 143 n.12 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)); see also Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 732 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143
n.12, and concluding that “[i]n short, the Fourth Amendment does not protect expectations of privacy
that only a criminal would have”).
86. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[E]xposure of respondent’s luggage,
which was located in a public place, to a trained canine [] did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.”).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that an exterior sniff is
not a search); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding that the use of narcotics
dog to sniff exterior of vehicle during lawful traffic stop not a search).
89. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate interest has been
compromised. But even if the results are negative—merely disclosing
that the substance is something other than cocaine—such a result reveals
nothing of special interest. Congress has decided . . . to treat the interest
in “privately” possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental
conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other
arguably “private” fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.90
In other words, government investigative conduct only violates reasonable
expectations of privacy if there is some possibility that the conduct will expose
an innocent private fact. For example, the physical search of luggage violates
reasonable expectations of privacy because, unlike a canine sniff of the exterior,
physically opening luggage potentially exposes non-contraband items contained
in the luggage—therefore potentially exposing the owner of the luggage to
“embarrassment and inconvenience.”91 Thus, when examining whether
government conduct violates reasonable expectations of privacy, the Court
considers whether the conduct could conceivably reveal innocent, private
information—such as “letters or photographs”92 or “at what hour each night the
lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.”93
The Court’s search cases therefore demonstrate that the determination of
whether governmental conduct violates reasonable expectations of privacy
assumes that the target of the conduct is innocent of any criminal wrongdoing.
The investigative conduct can only violate reasonable privacy expectations if it
could conceivably reveal innocent information.
Moreover, the Court has also instructed that courts apply the innocentperson perspective to determine whether government conduct is a seizure (as
opposed to whether it is a search). In Florida v. Bostick,94 for example, the Court
addressed whether police seized defendants during a “drug interdiction” on a
long haul bus. In holding that the defendants were not seized because a
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the police encounter, the
Court explicitly stated that “the ‘reasonable person’ test presupposes an innocent

90. Id. at 123; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), cited with approval by Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). “The fact that Royer knew
the search was likely to turn up contraband is of course irrelevant; the potential intrusiveness of the
officers’ conduct must be judged from the viewpoint of an innocent person in Royer’s position.” Royer,
460 U.S. at 519 n.4; see also Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983).
91. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
92. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (“It matters not that the search uncovered
nothing of any great personal value to respondent . . . rather than (what might conceivably have been
hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs.”).
93. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 192 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
privately owned, undeveloped land because “many landowners like to take solitary walks,” “meet
lovers” or “fellow worshippers,” or conduct other criminally innocent activities on their properties).
94. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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person.”95 Similarly, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,96 the Court
considered the degree of intrusion that a roadside sobriety checkpoint imposed
from the point of view of the innocent driver: “The ‘fear and surprise’ to be
considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the
prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and
surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop.”97
All of this suggests that the innocent person is the lodestar of Fourth
Amendment analyses. Nonetheless, efforts to enforce the amendment’s
protections are almost “always presented to courts by a criminal defendant whose
hands are dirty.”98 Courts typically make these assessments in the context of
suppression hearings, where a search yielded incriminating evidence, which is
itself squarely before the court.99 A judge’s exposure to that information could
well bias the court against more robust applications of the Fourth Amendment.
Rarely do Fourth Amendment issues arise in cases without incriminating
evidence. Although individuals can sue for Fourth Amendment violations under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourth Amendment cases are usually brought when the police
have failed to find incriminating evidence.100 § 1983 claims are far less common
than suppression hearings and appeals of decisions about whether to suppress
evidence in criminal trials.101 This is certainly the case when we look at Supreme
Court decisions. In case after case, the Justices knew of incriminating evidence
that the police found when they decided whether particular conduct violated a
person’s reasonable expectations of privacy.102
95. Id. at 438.
96. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
97. 496 U.S. at 452.
98. Baradaran, supra note 83, at 1.
99. See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 771 (“The typical Fourth Amendment
case involves a clearly guilty person, often charged with a serious crime, whose only argument at a
pretrial suppression hearing or on appeal is that the evidence against him was illegally seized.”).
100. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000) (addressing a request for
declaratory relief by two motorists who “were each stopped at a narcotics checkpoint,” which uncovered
no evidence of wrongdoing, and who “filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the class of all
motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped in the future”); see also Nancy Leong,
Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 432 (2012) (addressing the problem in § 1983 claims of “[h]ow
does one value the harm to an innocent plaintiff illegally detained for five minutes in order to perform a
stop and frisk that yielded no evidence?”).
101. Leong, supra note 100, at 422–23 (finding that between 2005 and 2009, 71 percent of
published appellate decisions involving Fourth Amendment claims related to suppression hearings and
28 percent related to § 1983 claims).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012) (“The Government introduced
at trial the same GPS-derived locational data . . . which connected Jones to the alleged conspirators’
stash house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97 kilograms of cocaine, and 1 kilogram of cocaine base.”);
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (holding that police officers did not seize the defendant
when they boarded a long-haul bus at a scheduled stop and “discovered cocaine when they searched a
suitcase belonging to [the defendant]”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984) (holding that
police officers trespass onto private land outside the curtilage, which revealed “a field of marihuana,”
was not a search); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455–56 (1928) (holding a federal wiretap
was not a search, wherein it “disclose[d] a conspiracy of amazing magnitude to import, possess, and sell

2018]

WHY COURTS FAIL TO PROTECT PRIVACY

283

Although judges know that they should not consider incriminating evidence
in determining whether a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, it is
easier said than done. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged this problem in
Beck v. Ohio when they suggested that decisions made before a search takes
place are more reliable than those made afterwards because of concerns of
“hindsight judgment.”103 Psychological studies have confirmed that individuals
are susceptible to hindsight bias. Accordingly, we hypothesize that exposure to
incriminating evidence can reduce the likelihood of judges finding a violation of
reasonable expectations of privacy than they would absent that exposure. If true,
this suggests that courts might be under-protecting privacy interests under the
Fourth Amendment.
Numerous studies have shown that hindsight bias can impact decision
making. As early as 1975, Baruch Fishhoff demonstrated that when people know
of a particular outcome, they tend to overestimate the likelihood of that
outcome.104 Jeffrey Rachlinski has provided an exhaustive catalog of studies
demonstrating this type of hindsight bias in a broad range of contexts.105 These
include studies that ask individuals to predict the likelihood of events as disparate
as the consequences of diplomatic missions and the findings of the Rodney King
case.106 But hindsight bias is not limited to misestimating likelihoods.
Another related form of hindsight bias is sometimes called “outcome
bias.”107 Outcome bias occurs when the consequences of a decision have
inordinate influence on the assessment of that decision’s quality. In some cases,

liquor unlawfully,” including “the employment of not less than 50 persons, of two sea-going vessels for
the transportation of liquor to British Columbia, of smaller vessels for coastwise transportation to the
state of Washington” and aggregate annual sales that “must have exceeded $2,000,000”).
103. 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by
an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure
on an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar
shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (“Decisions under the Fourth Amendment, taken in the long view, have not given the
protection to the citizen which the letter and spirit of the Amendment would seem to require. One reason,
I think, is that wherever a culprit is caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth Amendment cases, it is
difficult to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose.”); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth
Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 915 (1991) (arguing that granting warrants before a
magistrate knows whether the police will find evidence or whether the suspect is a criminal helps
eliminate judicial bias).
104. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
105. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 578–80 (1998).
106. See Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen”: Remembered
Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORG. BEH. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1, 6–7 (1975) (discussing
Nixon’s 1972 diplomatic missions to China and Russia); Lee J. Gilbertson et al., A Study of Hindsight
Bias: The Rodney King Case in Retrospect, 74 PSYCH. REP. 383, 385 (1994).
107. The nomenclature is inconsistent. Sometimes scholars simply call this phenomenon
“hindsight bias” while others consider it a separate but related phenomenon called outcome bias. From
this point onwards, we use the term outcome bias except when quoting others.
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using outcomes to assess actions is perfectly logical.108 For example, when a
toaster explodes, evidence tends to show that some defect caused the explosion.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that people associate positive outcomes with good
decisions and negative outcomes with poor decisions.
In contrast, outcome bias exists when evidence of outcome is given too
much weight—or in its extreme form, when that evidence should have no bearing
on the decision at issue. Determining whether particular conduct is a search that
the Fourth Amendment protects falls into this latter category. The legal test asks
whether the police violated the subject’s reasonable expectations of privacy.
Those expectations are unrelated to whether or not incriminating evidence is
found. To the extent that incriminating evidence plays a role in classifying
conduct as searches, it is fair to say those decisions suffer from outcome bias.
Studies have shown outcome bias occurs in many contexts.109 For example,
Jonathan Baron and John Hershey found that individuals evaluated the same sets
of physician decisions differently depending on whether they were told the
outcome was a success or a failure.110 In one of their experiments, participants
concluded that the same physician decisions were more “correct” than
“incorrect” when particular treatments were successful.111 Kim Kamin and
Jeffrey Rachlinski found outcome bias when assessing the need for anti-flood
precautions.112 Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and John Payne found that
individuals were less likely to conclude that a train was safe to operate after they
were told it had an accident.113
More importantly for our purposes, two studies have tested hindsight bias
in the context of Fourth Amendment searches with somewhat contradictory
findings. In 1989, Jonathan Casper, Kennette Benedict, and Jo Perry tested
outcome bias in a § 1983 civil rights action.114 They demonstrated that when
mock jurors were told that the search found evidence of illegal conduct, the mock
jurors were nine percent less likely to find the police liable for violating the

108. See Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1334 (2016) (“When
one occurrence tends to lead to another, evidence of the second occurrence is suggestive of the first.”);
Fischhoff & Beyth, supra note 106, at 2 (“[I]n many cases the postdictive probability of events which
have happened is justifiably higher than the corresponding predictive probability.”).
109. See Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A MetaAnalysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991) (reviewing 122 studies of
hindsight bias).
110. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 571–74 (1988).
111. Id. at 571–72.
112. Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 98 (1995).
113. See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases:
Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 609–
10 (1999).
114. Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making, Attitudes,
and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989).
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subject’s civil rights.115 Moreover, to the extent the mock jurors did find liability,
they awarded both smaller compensatory and punitive damage awards.116
Subsequently, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew Wistrich
conducted a series of experiments aimed at determining whether hindsight bias
affected judges’ decision making. In most of the experiments, they found that
hindsight bias affected judges to a similar degree as ordinary people.117 However,
in one experiment they found an anomaly: hindsight bias did not appear to affect
judges when making probable cause determinations.118 In that experiment,
researchers gave one group of judges a factual pattern and asked them if there
was sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant (i.e., the foresight
condition). The researchers then gave a second group of judges the same factual
pattern but told them that the search had found incriminating evidence (i.e., the
hindsight condition).119 Researchers also asked them whether there was probable
cause, but in the context of a suppression hearing. In the foresight condition,
23.9% (11 out of 46) of the judges concluded that there was probable cause for
a search and granted a warrant and, in the hindsight condition, 27.7% (13 out of
47) of the judges concluded that there was probable cause for a search and
admitted the testimony.120 Relying on this data, the authors concluded that
“[j]udges were able to ignore the damning evidence that the search produced and
make essentially the same decision as judges who were unaware of what the
search would uncover.”121
Concerned that their first experiment was insufficiently powered,
Rachlinski et al. proceeded to conduct three more experiments to test whether
hindsight bias affected judges as they made probable cause determinations.122
Combining the results from these experiments, they found that 41.6% (126 out
of 303) of judges found probable cause in the foresight conditions and 45.4%
115. Id. at 299 (across all three types of criminal activity tested).
116. Id. at 299–300.
117. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1512–16 (2009) (finding
hindsight bias affected state judges’ decisions); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 818 (2001) (finding that the magnitude of
the effects of hindsight bias in judges was comparable to that found when studying mock juries and
laypersons); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005)
(finding hindsight bias in most contexts in seven experiments).
118. Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1283.
119. The evidence was “10 pounds of methamphetamine, other drug paraphernalia, and a gun
that had recently been fired.” Id. at 1315.
120. Id. at 1316.
121. Id. at 1317.
122. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable Cause, Probability,
and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 75–76 (2011). Indeed, using their data, our own
calculations suggests that the 95% confidence of their first experiment was between negative 15% to a
positive 22%. Thus, these results do not disprove the existence of hindsight bias. On the importance of
using confidence intervals, see John M. Hoenig & Dennis M. Heisey, The Abuse of Power: The
Pervasive Fallacy of Power Calculations for Data Analysis, 55 AM. STATISTICIAN 19 (2001).
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(132 out of 291) found probable cause in the hindsight conditions.123 Rachlinski
et al. summarized their findings: “Judges seem able to overcome a pervasive
cognitive bias in judgment on an important aspect of the criminal justice
system.”124
Now one may suppose that judges’ special training and education may
allow them to perform better than the mock jurors in Casper’s study.125 We
remain skeptical. As Rachlinski and his co-authors acknowledge, their findings
are inconsistent with the vast body of literature on hindsight bias, including their
own previous studies that found that hindsight bias does affect judges.126
Moreover, we have two specific concerns about their most recent results. First,
the team’s very success may have adversely affected their ability to repeat the
same kind of experiment with more judges. Judges may be getting “savvy” to
their tests.127 If judges had read the team’s prior published work or talked with
past participants in any of the other nine judicial conferences where the
experiments were run, they may have become aware of the purpose of the
experiment.128 It is not apparent from the papers whether the authors examined
this particular threat to validity by, for example, asking respondents what they
believed was the purpose of the study.
Second, the studies cover different scenarios. Therefore, it is not
appropriate to simply aggregate the results as if they represented one experiment.
A better approach would be to use a logistic regression that treats each study as
a separate factor. We performed such an analysis and found that the results point
in the direction of hindsight bias but are not statistically significant at the p = .05
level.129 In other words, the 95% confidence interval includes the possibilities
that hindsight information may either increase or decrease the likelihood that a
judge would find a Fourth Amendment violation.
123. Rachlinski et al., supra note 122, at 93.
124. Id. at 98.
125. Id. at 96–97.
126. See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. Nancy Leong has also found that civil
plaintiff’s asserting Fourth Amendments claims are far more successful than criminal defendants
asserting a Fourth Amendment defense. Unfortunately, it is impossible to disentangle sample biases
because the civil cases are likely to differ significantly from their criminal counterparts. See Leong,
supra note 100, at 429; see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Benjamin Woodson, Motivated Cognition on the
Bench: Does Criminal Egregiousness Influence Judges’ Admissibility Decisions in Search-and-Seizure
Cases? 23–24 (Apr. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review)
(analyzing 558 search and seizure decisions and concluding that judges consider the seriousness of the
crime when making exclusionary rule decisions, but only for the most intrusive searches).
127. See Yanna Krupnikov & Adam Seth Levine, Cross-Sample Comparisons and External
Validity, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCI. 59, 62 (2014) (describing how knowledge of experimental
manipulations can contaminate responses).
128. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 122, at 76 (explaining that the studies were conducted across
ten judicial conferences). On the importance of blinding social science research, see generally
CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON & AARON S. KESSELHEIM, BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS:
STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (2016).
129. The log of the ratio of the odds of granting with hindsight to granting without hindsight was
0.166 (p =.339). The 95% confidence interval ranges from -0.174 to 0.506.
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B. The First Person Perspective versus Egocentrism
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions also make it clear a
person’s reasonable expectations of privacy should be judged from the subjective
perspective of the person being searched.130 Although the test is not merely
subjective (based on the peculiar beliefs of the actual person being searched), the
reasonableness is judged from the perspective of the person being investigated
or restrained, not from the perspective of an impartial bystander.
This first person perspective is evident in Katz itself. The first prong of the
Katz two-part test is whether the person being investigated “exhibited an actual
[subjective] expectation of privacy.”131 The second prong asks whether that
expectation of privacy—that is, the actual expectation the person investigated
subjectively held—is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”132
The Supreme Court’s subsequent application of the Katz test makes clear
that the test of reasonableness is considered from the first person perspective. To
take but one example, in the Ciraolo decision discussed above, the Court
concluded that “respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from
such observation is unreasonable,”133 and “it is unreasonable for respondent to
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being
observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.”134
Nonetheless, when judges actually make such determinations about the
intrusiveness of police conduct, they are never the subject of the search. They
are sitting in judgment.
We hypothesize that judges will evaluate actions directed against others
less harshly than actions directed to themselves. This would be a kind of
egocentric bias. Studies have shown that perspective can affect moral judgments.
People provide higher estimates of what is a fair wage or a fair settlement when
they assume that the outcome will benefit them.135 One experiment even
demonstrated that students characterized librarians as more moral (honest, fair,
and proper) when the librarians broke rules (i.e., waived fines) that benefited the
students as opposed to others.136 Thus, the typical understanding of self-interest

130. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (citing with approval Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
131. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
135. David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, in EQUITY
THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 135, 153 (David M. Messick & Karen
S. Cook eds, 1983); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135–59 (1993).
136. Konrad Bocian & Bogdan Wojciszke, Self-Interest Bias in Moral Judgments of Others’
Actions, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 4–5 (2014).
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bias in the moral decision-making context is that individuals find behavior to be
fairer or more just when it benefits them.
A natural corollary is that individuals are likely to characterize behavior as
less fair when it harms them. Thus, when police conduct is directed at a person,
that person is more likely to think that such conduct is unfair (first person), or in
the language of the Fourth Amendment “unreasonable,” than when the same
conduct is directed at another person (third person). If judges are susceptible to
this kind of self-interest bias, we would expect them to be less likely to find that
the Fourth Amendment protects against police searches.
Self-interest may not be the only explanation for egocentric biases.
Nicholas Epley and Eugene Caruso suggest a different explanation. They argue
that people make moral judgments using their own perspective because of
“automatic and unconscious psychological mechanisms.”137 But regardless of
the root cause of egocentric biases, our hypothesis is that such a bias may be
present in the Fourth Amendment context. If it is present, we would expect to
see courts under-protect an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.138
Slobogin and Schumacher tested this very issue. They found “clear support
for the proposition that searches and seizures tend to be viewed as more intrusive
when their target is the subject-participant rather than ‘another’ . . . .”139 Kugler
and Strahilevitz also found a “slight[]” first person effect.140 Our study seeks to
replicate these findings using a larger and more representative sample.
Moreover, instead of only using the intrusiveness scale that Slobogin and
Schumacher used, we also ask participants the question the Supreme Court’s test
posed: does the conduct described in each scenario violate reasonable
expectations of privacy? Framing questions in this way may help us understand
the potential impact of these biases. Specifically, we can learn if there are any
scenarios where participants would say that their expectations of privacy are not
violated in the third person/no outcome condition, but are violated in the first
person/outcome condition.
C. Criminal Justice Experience, Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
The members of the judiciary who decide Fourth Amendment questions on
behalf of the American society are not representative of the nation as a whole.

137. Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 171, 173
(2004).
138. We make no claims that the first person perspective is actually better than the third-person
for purpose of determining what conduct should be classified as a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Rather we simply accept the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and suggest that judges may have difficulty
correctly applying the existing standard because of egocentric bias.
139. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 759–60. The study had participants rated 50
scenarios’ “intrusiveness” on a scale from 1 to 100. Participant responses to scenarios framed in the first
person averaged 60.3 while responses to those framed in the third person averaged 56.3 (p < .05). Id. at
759–60 & n.109.
140. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 248 n.170.
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Though trends are complex, prior literature shows demographic factors may
shape a wide range of perceptions.141 If demographic factors shape perceptions
of police activities, differences between the demographics of the public and the
judiciary could systematically distort decisions concerning potential Fourth
Amendment violations. For this analysis, we review the demographics of the
federal judiciary as well as state judiciaries, whose criminal docket dwarfs the
federal docket.142
African Americans and Hispanics are also much more likely to be
imprisoned in the U.S.143 They are also more likely to be the subject of a police
search.144 Recently, litigation over New York’s stop and frisk policy concluded
that “the NYPD carries out more stops in areas with more black and Hispanic
residents, even when other relevant variables are held constant,” and “within any
area, regardless of its racial composition, blacks and Hispanics are more likely
to be stopped than whites.”145 These experiences with the criminal justice system
could shape perceptions of the police among the defendants, their friends, and
their families.146 In comparison to the most often targeted minority populations,
judges presumably have little experience as the target of a police investigation
or incarceration.

141. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (reporting experiments with actual judges showing implicit
biases, which were not consistently evoked in simulated judicial decisions); Sunita Sah, Christopher T.
Robertson & Shima B. Baughman, Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to
Reduce Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 69–76 (2015)
(reviewing the literature for race in the context of prosecutorial decision making); Max Schanzenbach,
Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-level Judicial Demographics, 34
J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 57–92 (2005) (finding that “judges’ race and sex have little influence on prison
sentences in general but do affect racial and sex disparities”).
142. State courts handled 1.1 million felony convictions in a recent year versus 80,000 federal
defendants sentenced. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 215646, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 (2007),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf [https://perma.cc/63L2-6UQU].
143. See PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 7 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P5K3-J5NL] (internal citation omitted) (“[B]lack non-Hispanic males had an
imprisonment rate (3,074 per 100,000 U.S. black male residents) that was nearly 7 times higher than
white non-Hispanic males (459 per 100,000).”); see also id. at 26 (providing statistics for Hispanic
prisoners).
144. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 173–75 (2001) (discussing New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy’s
disproportionate effect on racial minorities); DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL
PROFILING CANNOT WORK 62–64 (2002) (discussing racial disparities in stopping and searching
motorists).
145. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
146. See Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy:
Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751
(2014).

290

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:263

Unsurprisingly, the judiciary tends to be more male, white, affluent, and
educated than ordinary members of the public.147 While women comprise
slightly more than half the general population, they only make up 37 percent of
active U.S. Circuit Court judges and 34 percent of active U.S. District Court
judges.148 The numbers for women on the state court level are similar to the
federal numbers, and not a single state has as many women judges as men.149
The story is more nuanced for African American judges. While they are
now fairly well-represented in the federal judiciary, that has not historically been
the case. In 2010, African Americans made up 12.6 percent of the U.S.
population.150 The numbers for active federal courts now roughly corresponds to
that number: 13 percent of active U.S. Circuit Court judges and 14 percent of
active U.S. District Court judges are African American.151 However, if we look
at judges that have taken senior status (as of March 7, 2014), the numbers drop
to 5.3 percent and 6.6 percent, respectively.152 Since senior judges are those who
have been serving for longer periods of time, it is fair to suggest that African
American federal judges have likely decided proportionately fewer Fourth
Amendment cases. That suggests that African American federal judges likely
have had less impact on the precedent—going back as far as fifty years on what
constitutes reasonable expectations of privacy—that now shapes decisions. In
addition, state courts are not nearly as representative as the federal judiciary. As
of 2014, African Americans only made up 7.2 percent of state court judges.153
Hispanics are still underrepresented on both the federal and state benches.
In 2010, Hispanics made up 17.3 percent of the population.154 Yet, as of 2014,
Hispanics only made up 9 percent of active and 3.5 percent of senior federal
circuit court judges, and 10 percent of active and 3.2 percent of senior federal
district court judges.155 Their numbers were even smaller at the state level,
making up only 5.4 percent of state court judges.156
Judges are also more educated and wealthier than typical Americans. By
virtue of their position, they all (or substantially all) have a law degree, while

147. One recent study found that white men are the most overrepresented group (nearly double
the numbers found in the general population). TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM.
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 7 (2016).
148. See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 4, 15 (2017), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZG5L-5N8T].
149. GEORGE & YOON, supra note 147, at 18 tbl.A-6 (finding that women make 30.2 percent of
state court judges).
150. See Appendix B (containing demographics data from the 2010 U.S. Census).
151. MCMILLION, supra note 148, at 5, 17.
152. See BARRY J. MCMILLION, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF
SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 13, 21 (2014) [hereinafter MCMILLION 2014].
153. GEORGE & YOON, supra note 147, at 18 tbl.A-7.
154. See Appendix B.
155. MCMILLION 2014, supra note 152, at 13, 21.
156. GEORGE & YOON, supra note 147, at 18 tbl.A-7.
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only 1.4 percent of the general population have a professional degree.157 Judicial
salaries uniformly exceed $100,000, sometimes by a great deal,158 while the large
majority of Americans make substantially less than this amount.159 Given these
additional differences in demographics, it would not be surprising if judges’
attitudes differed from the population at large. If these demographic disparities
cause disparities in perceptions of police activities, such a result would, on the
Court’s own terms, undermine the Court’s decisions and jurisprudence on what
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. Such a result would raise
questions about the sociological legitimacy of police behavior, which relies on
the legal doctrine.
D. Prior Studies on Expectations of Privacy
Several prior empirical studies have investigated reasonable expectations
of privacy. Slobogin and Schumacher’s landmark 1993 study assessed the
relative level of “intrusiveness” of different types police conduct.160 They asked
217 participants to rate fifty scenarios on a 1-100 “intrusiveness” scale.161 In
addition to testing attitudes given particular scenarios, Slobogin and Schumacher
sought to test whether first person bias and/or context affected people’s attitudes.
They posed scenarios either as if they were happening to the participant (first
person) or someone else (third person). In another manipulation, they told one
group of participants what evidence the police were hoping to obtain while
withholding this information from another group.162
While Slobogin and Schumacher found that in many cases individual
attitudes generally corresponded to Supreme Court jurisprudence, in other areas
they found that the Court often underestimated what members of the public
thought was private.163 Perhaps more importantly, they also explored why Court
doctrine might differ from the ordinary person’s privacy views. They found that
individuals saw conduct as more intrusive when presented with scenarios in the
first person condition than when presented in the third person, which corresponds
to a judge’s third person perspective.164 Additionally, when individuals were not

157. See Appendix B (counting PhD and Masters degrees as equivalent would add 1.2 percent
and 6.7 percent respectively).
158. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, MONIQUE CHASE & EMMA GREENMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY (2010); WOMEN AND THE LAW 50 app.E (Jane C. Moriarty
ed., 2009) (surveying judicial salaries in ten states which all exceed $100,000). The base salary of a U.S.
District Judge in 2017 is $205,100. See Judicial Compensation, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation [https://perma.cc/3CQH-RVU3].
159. See Appendix B (showing that the percentage of Americans that make more and less than
$50,000 is fairly evenly split).
160. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7.
161. Id. at 735–39.
162. Id. at 732, 735–36.
163. Id. at 739–42. Slobogin & Schumacher note that attitudes and court doctrine diverged in the
use of undercover agents and dog sniffing, among others. Id.
164. Id. at 759–61.
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told the search’s objective, they found the conduct less intrusive.165 The authors
interpret their results as suggesting that the courts, which commonly make
decisions knowing that evidence has been found, “underestimate the
intrusiveness of police actions . . . .”166
While Slobogin and Schumacher’s study was groundbreaking for its time,
their sample was both small and unrepresentative. With the exception of twentyfive citizens of Gainesville, Florida, the 217 participants were students, some
from Australia.167 Moreover, while the authors speculated that participants may
have been using hindsight bias in their response, the questions actually only told
participants the objective of the investigation. The questions did not say anything
about the outcome.168 Because the participants may have taken the questions at
face value without assuming any particular outcome, the survey was not properly
designed to test for hindsight/outcome bias.169
Over the following two decades, researchers conducted a handful of followup studies that focused on narrower issues. However, because these studies often
used very specific populations, they may not reflect the attitudes of society as a
whole. For example, in 2002, Slobogin relied on a sample of 190 people called
for jury duty in Gainesville, Florida, to examine privacy attitudes on the use of
camera surveillance.170 A few years later, Slobogin surveyed privacy attitudes
on data mining using seventy-six members of the Gainesville jury pool.171 In a
2009 study relying on a sample of 159 undergraduate psychology students,
Jeremy Blumenthal et al. looked at how the severity of the criminal activity in
question and the type of evidence being sought affected how intrusive
participants viewed different scenarios.172
In 2011, Henry Fradella and his colleagues sought to evaluate privacy
attitudes by using a five-point Likert scale to determine whether participants
agreed with or disagreed with Fourth Amendment precedent.173 Like Slobogin
and Schumacher, Fradella et al. found that participants generally had stronger
views of privacy than the courts did.174 But again, Fradella study’s sample was
not representative. The “overwhelming number” of the 589 participants were
165. Id.
166. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7.
167. Id. at 737.
168. Id. at 761.
169. Id. (discussing the two ways participants could have interpreted these questions).
170. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 276 (2002).
171. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317, 335 (2008).
172. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of
Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 344 (2009).
173. Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 342 (2011)
(indicating participants could select among the following responses: strongly disagree, disagree, neither
agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree).
174. Id. at 362–66.
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college students and faculty.175 These sorts of studies simply substitute one
unrepresentative group (the judiciary) for another.
More recently, studies have begun to use larger and more diverse samples
to assess whether Supreme Court doctrine is consistent with society’s attitude on
privacy. Christine Scott-Hayward and her co-authors relied on 1,198 people
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”), an online crowd-sourcing
marketplace.176 The study sought to assess expectations of privacy in electronic
information and see whether these attitudes supported the third party doctrine.
They found that participants felt entitled to higher levels of privacy than the
courts have provided and that their views were inconsistent with the third party
doctrine.177
Although superior to convenience samples of students or local jurors,
MTurk is still not representative of the U.S. population. Indeed, Kugler and
Strahilevitz found that “MTurk respondents are significantly more privacyprotective than the general U.S. population, perhaps because they skew
younger.”178 Consequently, they argued MTurk samples are not useful to assess
the base-rate support for privacy-related beliefs in the general population, but
they did suggest that such samples may be useful to evaluate the relative
intrusiveness of different searches.179 Such online samples are also useful for
conducting randomized experiments that test for cognitive biases like the ones
we study here. In addition, with a large enough sample, it is also possible to
reweigh responses to correspond to national demographics, as we did for our
sample.
In a similar vein, Alison Smith et al. modeled their case on Fradella’s
method, but used Survey Monkey to recruit a pool of 1,008 participants. 180 Smith
provided the participants with five short vignettes describing police use of
technology to investigate criminal activity.181 The researchers then gave the
participants several statements expressing different potential points of view
about the vignettes and asked them whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statements using a five-point Likert scale.182 With respect to many specific
scenarios, Smith’s results confirmed what Fradella found.
Smith’s study used richer scenarios that more closely resemble the facts
courts actually encounter. However, her claims of using a “nationally
175. Id. at 342. Participants were solicited in two ways: through an email invitation to students
and faculty at eleven colleges and universities and through Facebook. Id. at 346.
176. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require
Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 51–52 (2015).
177. Id. at 58.
178. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 233 n.113.
179. Id.
180. Alisa Smith, Sean Madden & Robert P. Barton, An Empirical Examination of Societal
Expectations of Privacy in The Digital Age of GPS, Cell Phone Towers, & Drones, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 111, 127–29 (2016).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 127.
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representative respondent sample” appear to be overstated.183 For example,
women and African Americans are both significantly overrepresented in Smith’s
sample (as compared to U.S. Census data), making up 54.6 percent and 25.0
percent of the sample, respectively.184 Our study found that African Americans
are significantly more protective of their privacy. Accurate population estimates
would thus require reweighting of the studied sample, an adjustment that is not
apparent in Smith’s methods.
Finally, Kugler and Strahilevitz have conducted two studies on the Fourth
Amendment. In their first study, using a survey firm called Toluna, they recruited
1,461 participants to mirror the demographics of the U.S. population along
several dimensions.185 Their study focused on a narrow, albeit important, issue:
whether the Supreme Court’s so-called “mosaic theory” was consistent with the
public’s privacy views. Rooted in Jones, mosaic theory suggests that relatively
short-term GPS monitoring of a person’s movements might be permissible under
the Fourth Amendment, but longer-term monitoring “impinges on expectations
of privacy.”186 The study showed that the public disagreed with mosaic theory.
In fact, “a large majority of Americans always expect privacy in their geolocation
information, a meaningful minority never expect privacy, and only a tiny
remnant allow their expectations to depend on surveillance duration.”187 More
recently, Kugler and Strahilevitz conducted another survey at different points in
time to test whether expectations of privacy are circular.188 In other words, they
sought to determine whether Supreme Court decisions change privacy
expectations.189 Although they found that attitudes changed soon after a Supreme
Court decision, those effects disappeared after a year or two. The authors
concluded that privacy expectations are more stable than many predict.190
III.
METHODOLOGY
We conducted an online survey experiment asking 1,200 participants to
evaluate the reasonableness of eighteen different investigative actions. Thirteen
are investigative actions that the government is already conducting or is expected
to conduct in the near future, but whose status as a search the Supreme Court has
not yet resolved. In addition, participants were also asked to answer questions on

183. Id. at 114.
184. Id. at 130–31.
185. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 245–46.
186. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring).
187. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 209–10.
188. Kugler & Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, supra note 77, at 1776.
189. Id. at 1752 (discussing that under the “circularity” theory, expectations of privacy drive
Supreme Court precedent, but many legal thinkers suspect that Supreme Court precedent also drives the
public’s expectations of privacy).
190. Id. at 1794.
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five scenarios on which the Supreme Court has already ruled.191 These five
scenarios replicate some of Slobogin and Schumacher’s findings and also allow
us to compare our findings with the views of the Supreme Court.
For each scenario, we asked participants to answer two questions, which
served as our primary dependent variables. First, like Slobogin and Schumacher,
we asked participants to rate each scenario based on the level of intrusiveness
using a scale from 1 to 100.192 Second, we asked participants to answer whether
the actions described in each scenario violated “reasonable expectations of
privacy” with a simple “yes” or “no.” We believe that the second question
corresponds more closely to the ultimate Fourth Amendment question courts
have posed and allows us to make more direct comparisons to the doctrinal
holdings. To avoid ordering effects, the scenarios were presented to participants
in random order.
For each of these scenarios, we performed two randomized manipulations
in between-subjects design, as shown in Table 1 (and more extensively in
Appendix A). First, we asked some participants to assess the scenarios from the
first person perspective and others to do so from the third person perspective. In
other words, we wrote different versions of the same scenario as if it were
happening to the person answering the survey (i.e., first person) or another
person (i.e., third person). Second, we manipulated both the instructions and
questions to test for outcome bias. In one condition, we told participants that the
police were looking for incriminating evidence, but that the subject of the search
was innocent. This version of the instructions tracked how courts frame the legal
standard for determining reasonable expectations of privacy.193 In our second
condition, we told participants that while the subject of the search must be
presumed innocent, in fact “the police found evidence of criminal activity.”
We intended for these two manipulations together to reveal whether
decision making based on the way judges typically assess reasonable
expectations of privacy in the real world (third person/outcome) yields different
results than the way judges are told to make these assessments based on Supreme
Court jurisprudence (first person/no evidence).

191. Slobogin used this technique in one later study. Slobogin, supra note 171, at 333–34 (The
five baseline scenarios tracked established precedent, covering searches of bedrooms, searches of cars,
pat-downs or frisks, a brief stop for purposes of obtaining identification, and a stop at a roadblock).
192. Slobogin was kind enough to provide us a copy of his original survey.
193. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 437–38 (1991)) (“The reasonable person test . . . is objective and ‘presupposes an innocent
person.’”).
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Table 1. Text Manipulations by Experimental Conditions (2x2 Design)

No Evidence
of Crime

Evidence
Crime

of

First Person
Would it violate your
reasonable expectations of
privacy if the conduct
described in the preceding
statement occurred?
Would it violate your
reasonable expectations of
privacy if the actions
described in the preceding
statement were used to
obtain evidence that you
committed a crime?

Third Person
Would it violate a person’s
reasonable
expectations
of
privacy if the conduct described in
the preceding statement occurred?
Would it violate a person’s
reasonable
expectations
of
privacy if the actions described in
the preceding statement were used
to obtain evidence that the person
committed a crime?

We collected other demographic information, such as political party
identification, which can be used as a covariate. We also asked about past
experience with law enforcement of participants as well as their family and close
friends. To avoid biasing their answers to the privacy questions we asked
participants about their experience with law enforcement after they had answered
all the other questions. Moreover, they were not allowed to go back to revise
their earlier answers.
We used the Qualtrics platform to recruit participants. Although not a
probability sample of the U.S. population, Qualtrics recruits participants
nationwide from diverse panels of persons who have opted in to receiving such
requests to participate in surveys for compensation. We specified that the firm
would recruit at least half of the sample from populations other than nonHispanic Whites. By surveying more African Americans and Hispanics in
particular, we hoped to generate sufficient statistical power to assess whether
these groups had different views about privacy or police conduct than Whites
may have, thus making an advance on prior studies.
One thousand two hundred (1,200) participants completed our survey. We
report the demographic breakdown of these participants across each
experimental condition in Appendix B. Randomization succeeded in distributing
these covariates across experimental conditions. With eighteen scenarios per
respondent, we have 21,600 observations across the four experimental
conditions.
Our study included 770 participants that identified as White, 207 as African
American, 31 as American Indian, 99 as Asian, 8 as Pacific Islander, and 85 as
other. Hispanic ethnicity was asked as a separate question, as in the U.S. Census.
Across all the races, 263 participants also identified as Spanish/Hispanic/Latino,
including 170 who identified as Whites. As compared to the national census, our
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participants were more female, contained more minorities, and were politically
more democratic. To approximate national attitudes nonetheless, we reweighted
answers based on U.S. Census data (and, in the case of politics, national survey
data).194 The additional calculations did not change our results significantly.
Nonetheless, we report the reweighted data.
IV.
RESULTS
Figure 1 below illustrates the reweighted data with respect to violations of
reasonable expectations of privacy for each scenario. For each scenario, we
plotted responses based on the first person/no evidence version (the hypothetical
perspective set out by the Supreme Court) in black and the third person/evidence
version (the perspective from which most such decisions are actually made) in
red. Each vertical line corresponds to a 95% confidence interval with the point
representing the mean response.195
For examples of how to interpret this data, observe the black dot in the top
right corner, which shows that almost all of the respondents found that GPS
tracking violated their reasonable expectations of privacy and especially so when
asked about themselves as an innocent person. On the other hand, less than a
quarter of respondents found a privacy violation in the roadblock of a guilty third
party (the red dot in the lower left corner). We further illustrate these effects in
our discussion of each result.

194. The weighting was carried out using multiple iterative proportional fitting as implemented
in the R package. Johan Barthelemy, Thomas Suesse & Mohammad Namazi-Rad, CRAN—Package
mipfp, COMPREHENSIVE R ARCHIVE NETWORK (Dec. 1, 2016), https://CRAN.Rproject.org/package=mipfp [https://perma.cc/W9DH-3VDM] (R package version 3.0-1). The
demographic target proportions rounded to two places are as shown in Appendix B. These proportions
were condensed from U.S. demographic proportions to capture subgroups in the sample with distinct
response patterns, while avoiding excessive numbers of cells with low populations. For details of the
target weights, see Appendix B.
195. The variance computation uses variance decomposition and the delta method for estimating
the variance of the weight matrix. See Hao Lu & Andrew Gelman, A Method for Estimating DesignBased Sampling Variances for Surveys with Weighting, Poststratification, and Raking, 19 J. OFFICIAL
STAT. 133, 138 (2003). The empirical variance in cells with few respondents was estimated using the
maximum sample variance in the remaining cells. Id.
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Figure 1. Proportion of Respondents Finding Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy Violated for Each of 18 Scenarios Split by Experimental Condition (with
95% Confidence Intervals)
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A. Biases
We performed a mixed logistic regression analysis to isolate how different
variables affected outcomes in general. Our analysis found statistically
significant evidence of both outcome bias and self-interest bias. Figure 1 plots
the combined effect. Still, using regression models shown in Appendix C, we
first examined the biases separately and focused on outcome bias. When
participants were told that the police found incriminating evidence, the odds of
finding that the conduct violated a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
were 2.44 times less than when they were simply told that the subject of the
search was innocent (p < .0001).
We can gain an intuitive understanding of this effect by analyzing the
infrared photo scenario. In that scenario, we asked participants whether police
taking infrared images of a house to determine whether some surfaces (walls and
roof) are hotter than others violated reasonable expectations of privacy. In the
third person/no evidence version of this scenario, we found that 62.7% of the
population believed that such conduct violated reasonable expectations of
privacy. When we told participants that evidence of crime was found, but the
third person perspective was held constant, findings of a violation of reasonable
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expectations of privacy dropped from 62.7% to 40.8%.196 (This estimate is not
shown in Figure 1, which blends across the two manipulations.)
The results from our own study may underestimate hindsight bias in the
real world. In our “outcome” condition, we merely told participants that the
police found evidence that a person/they committed a crime. We did not state
what the evidence or the crime was. Outcome bias is likely to exist upon a
continuum. More powerful evidence (e.g., guns) or evidence of a more heinous
crime (e.g., a brutal murder) probably enhances the effect.197 Thus, our
experiment’s opaque outcome manipulation may understate the effect.
We also found first person bias, replicating Slobogin and Schumacher’s
findings.198 Additionally, our data provide some perspective on the degree of the
effect first person bias has on decision making. When participants were asked
questions about police conduct directed to another person (third party), they were
1.43 times less likely to find that the police conduct violated a person’s
reasonable expectations of privacy than when their own privacy interests were at
issue (first person) (p < .0010). We can see how this effect played out in the
roadblock scenario. When individuals were told that police conduct is directed
at a third person instead of themselves, the absolute likelihood that a person will
believe that conduct violates reasonable expectations of privacy dropped by
6.4% to 20.5%, a relative decrease of 23.8%.
As described earlier, judges typically decide cases with the knowledge of
incriminating evidence and in the third person. Thus, in the real world, the
question concerns the combined effect of these two biases. For example, in the
DNA scenario, we asked whether it violated reasonable expectations of privacy
for police to take DNA from a disposable coffee cup a person used at a police
station. In the third person/evidence version, on average 33.1% of the population
found that such conduct violated reasonable expectations of privacy. However,
that number nearly doubled to 59.4% in the first person/no evidence version of
that scenario. In other words, attitudes changed sufficiently so that activity that
would not be categorized as a search under one frame (the one most courts
actually use) would be categorized as a search in a different frame (the one courts
say they should use). Of course, for this illustration, we chose the DNA scenario
precisely because the two different versions were on opposite sides of the 50%
threshold. These results suggest that the decision-making biases in the Fourth
Amendment context are sufficiently significant that they may change the results
196. The odds ratio reflects how outcome bias impacted scenarios generally. Therefore, our
calculation does not precisely match the numbers from Table 1, which reflect how the bias affected each
individual scenario.
197. See Segal & Woodson, supra note 126, at 23–24 (observing that judges are affected by the
seriousness of the crime when making Fourth Amendment decisions for more intrusive searches); Avani
Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. L. J.
1543, 1571–73 (2015) (finding that lay participants were more likely to find evidence admissible when
the underlying crime was more egregious).
198. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 759–61.
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in close cases. Moreover, it is these close cases where judges are likely to be the
most vulnerable to the unconscious biases that we identify here. To avoid these
biases, we recommend that judges rely on surveys instead of their own intuitions
to resolve these Fourth Amendment questions.
B. By Scenario
Table 2 shows the results for the first person, no outcome version of each
scenario. The first column includes the wording of each scenario as given to the
survey participants. The second column indicates what percentage of the survey
participants answered “yes” to the question of whether the described actions
would violate the participants’ reasonable expectations of privacy. The final
column lists the mean “intrusiveness score” on a scale of 1 to 100, which the
participants assigned the actions in each scenario.
The table lists the scenarios according to the percentage of participants who
ranked the actions as violating their reasonable expectations of privacy. Note that
the ranking would have been very similar had the results been ordered by
intrusiveness rating. As one would expect, for the most part the scenarios that
more participants believed were a violation of their reasonable expectations of
privacy were the same scenarios that received higher intrusiveness ratings.

% Finding
Violation

Average
Intrusivenes
s

Table 2. Scenarios with Percent of Respondents Finding Violations of
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Average Intrusiveness Rating (1-100
scale) in First Person No-Outcome Condition

Roadblock - Police stopping you at a roadblock for fifteen seconds to
ask you questions.
Gunshot - Police using a system of GPS-enabled microphones in public
locations to detect and locate the sound of gunshots. The system
automatically stores sounds for two seconds before and four seconds
after a gunshot.
ID - Police stopping you on the street to ask you for identification.
DNA - Police obtaining your DNA from a disposable coffee cup you
use at the police station.

27%

37

35%

50

49%
59%

52
55

Infrared Photos - Police taking images of your house using an infrared
device to determine whether some surfaces (walls and roof) of your
house are hotter than others.
Trunk - Police looking through the trunk of your car on a public street.
E Retail - Police obtaining, from online retailers, all of the goods and
services you have bought online.

70%

64

67%
75%

66
67

Scenario
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Google Maps - Police obtaining data from Google that reflects your 76%
68
precise location as you use Google Maps on your smartphone.
Pat-down - Police stopping you on the street and patting down your 72%
68
outer clothing to feel for weapons.
Web - Police obtaining data from a website operator that reflects the 74%
68
name, email address, telephone number, and physical address you
entered when you opened an account on the website.
Dropped Phone - Police finding your smartphone, which you dropped 76%
71
on a public sidewalk, and examining the pictures and videos stored on
it.
Track Phone - Police determining your smartphone’s movements for a 85%
73
period of seven months by obtaining, from a cellular provider,
information from the cellphone towers.
Bedroom – Police searching your bedroom.
86%
73
Email - With help from your internet service provider, Police 87%
74
monitoring where and who you send emails to as well as how much
data is sent, with help from your internet service provider.
Stingray - Police using a device that pretends to be disguised as a cell 86%
77
phone tower to determine the location of your cell phone and record the
content of any messages or calls made near the device.
Drone - Police flying a drone equipped with a camera over your 85%
78
backyard at a height of sixty feet.
Cloud - Police obtaining photos, documents, emails, and the names, 86%
78
addresses, and phone numbers of your contacts that you have stored in
the Cloud.
GPS - Police attaching a GPS to the bottom of your vehicle and tracking 91%
80
the vehicle for twenty-eight days.
This ordinal ranking allows us to compare the views of the survey
participants (reweighted to fit national demographics) with the views of the
Supreme Court for those scenarios upon which the Supreme Court has
specifically ruled. We included six scenarios that the Court has addressed
precisely to allow for this comparison: police use of a roadblock;199 asking for
identification;200 taking infrared images of a house;201 searching the trunk of a
car;202 conducting a weapons pat-down;203 and searching a bedroom.204 In every
case, the Supreme Court held that the police conduct did constitute a search or
seizure. That is, in each of these six scenarios, the Court concluded that the police

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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conduct violated the subject’s reasonable expectations of privacy. That included
the roadblock scenario, which our survey respondents considered the least
intrusive upon privacy by a clear margin. In other words, if the Supreme Court
treated even a roadblock as a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy,
then a fortiori they should include every other scenario as a violation of
reasonable expectations of privacy. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent
with the societal expectations that the standard of reasonable expectations
purports to reflect, at least according to our survey.
The other scenarios we tested include uses of technology by the police—
such as tracking a person’s cell phone using information from the cell phone
provider and police obtaining information stored in the Cloud—that the Supreme
Court would not consider searches under the third party doctrine. The results of
our study therefore provide compelling evidence that applying the third party
doctrine to digital information, such as cell phone location information and
information stored on the Cloud, would be inconsistent with society’s reasonable
expectations of privacy. This finding—that individual expectations of privacy do
not support the third party doctrine—reinforced the findings of previous recent
studies and with a more robust and representative survey methodology.
Moreover, we can make deeper comparisons between the Supreme Court’s
views and those of our survey respondents. The Supreme Court does not treat all
searches and seizures as equally intrusive upon privacy. Some searches and
seizures are more intrusive upon reasonable expectations of privacy than others.
Sometimes, the Court expressly has stated that one privacy intrusion is greater
than another, such as searching a house versus searching an automobile.205 In
other cases, we can deduce the relative degrees of intrusion by what the Court
requires in order for each type of search to conform with the Fourth Amendment.
The most intrusive searches and seizures—such as those involving entry into the
home—must be supported by a warrant based on probable cause. But some
classes of searches and seizures require less exacting justification, including (in
descending order of exactitude) probable cause without a warrant; reasonable
suspicion; and neutral guidelines without individualized suspicion. As we
describe below, one of the factors (but not the only factor) that accounts for the
kind of justification required to validate a search or seizure is the degree of
privacy intrusion involved. We can therefore use the Court’s determinations
about what is required to justify a search or seizure to create a rough ranking of
the Supreme Court’s view about which searches and seizures are more intrusive
than others. Then, we can see whether the Court’s rankings align with those of
our survey respondents—something that none of the previous empirical studies
have done.

205. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (“[O]ne’s expectation
of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”).
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We therefore outline below the Court’s analysis of the six search and
seizure scenarios upon which it has ruled, described in descending order of the
degree of intrusiveness the Court’s analysis has suggested.
i. Police searching your bedroom.
The Supreme Court has regularly reiterated that a person’s expectations of
privacy are at their greatest with respect to physical intrusions into the person’s
home. For example, the Court asserted in Payton v. New York206 that: “The
Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In
none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.”207 The preeminence
of privacy within the home is grounded in both the text of the amendment (which
expressly refers to the security of persons’ houses208) and the Court’s assertion
that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”209 Hence, the Court treats “the sanctity of
a [person’s] home”210 as “the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the
Fourth Amendment,”211 and a warrant based on probable cause is required for
both searches and seizures inside a home.212
ii. Police taking images of your house using an infrared device
The Court held in Kyllo v. United States213 that “the use of a thermalimaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”214 The Court explained that the Government violates the
residents’ reasonable expectations of privacy when it “uses a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
206. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (declaring that a New York statute permitting warrantless entry into a
home with probable cause to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment).
207. Id. at 589.
208. See, e.g., id. at 589–90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))
(“That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘at the very core of the Fourth
Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.’”).
209. Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
210. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
211. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (1970)); see
also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (describing the interior of homes as “the prototypical
and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “a person’s body and home [are the] areas
afforded the greatest Fourth Amendment protection”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983)
(describing a “private residence” as the place “where reasonable expectations of privacy perhaps are at
their greatest”).
212. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477–478
(1971)) (asserting that “[i]t is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable”).
213. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
214. Id. at 29.
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been unknowable without physical intrusion.”215 Such a search is treated on the
same footing as a physical intrusion216 and therefore is also “presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant”217 supported by probable cause.
iii. Police looking through the trunk of your car on a public street
The Court has repeatedly held that searching the interior of a vehicle
(including the trunk) is a search that requires probable cause, but that in general
does not require a warrant.218 The Court recognized that exigent circumstances
apply because “the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.”219 More
fundamentally, the Court also based its holding—that a vehicle search is
reasonable with probable cause but “without the extra protection for privacy that
a warrant affords”220—on its belief that people have a “lesser expectation of
privacy in a motor vehicle.”221 Similarly, the Court in United States v. MartinezFuerte222 stated that “[o]ne’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of
freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”223
iv. Police stopping you on the street and patting down your other clothing to
feel for weapons
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status of “stop and frisks”
in the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio.224 In Terry, the Court held that a stop and
frisk in public was both a search and a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
Court declared:
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that
person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language
to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s
215. Id. at 40.
216. See, e.g., id. at 37 (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”); id. at 40 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S.
at 590) (citation omitted) (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance
to the house.’ That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear
specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.”).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may search an
automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or
evidence is contained.”); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
219. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
220. Id. at 50.
221. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
222. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
223. Id. at 561; see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 55 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (referring to “[t]he lowered expectation[s] of privacy in one’s automobile”).
224. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2018]

WHY COURTS FAIL TO PROTECT PRIVACY

305

clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a
“search.” 225
In other words, a stop and frisk intrudes upon reasonable expectations of
privacy, dignity,226 and freedom of movement. However, the Court also stated
that because the intrusiveness of a stop and frisk was less than that of “a
‘technical arrest’ or a ‘full-blown search,’”227 a warrant based on probable cause
was not required.228 Instead, the Court balanced the government interest in
conducting the search and seizure against the “constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen,”229 with “the scope of the particular intrusion . . .
a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.”230 Since a stop and frisk
“may realistically be characterized as something less than a ‘full’ search, even
though it remains a serious intrusion,”231 the Court concluded that reasonable
suspicion (a lesser standard than probable cause) was the appropriate standard
for justifying the police conduct.232 That is, a stop and frisk is permitted under
the Fourth Amendment “[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”233
v. Police stopping you on the street to ask you for identification
A police officer stopping someone on the street to ask for identification is
a temporary seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Terry established that a stop
on a public street requires reasonable suspicion. In Brown v. Texas,234 the
Supreme Court held specifically that such a stop accompanied by a demand for
identification was an unreasonable seizure because the officers involved lacked
“reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual [was]
involved in criminal activity.”235

225. Id. at 16.
226. Id. at 17 (stating that a stop and frisk “is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment”).
227. Id. at 19.
228. Id. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been,
and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”).
229. Id. at 21.
230. Id. at 19 n.15.
231. Id. at 26.
232. The Terry Court describes the reasonable suspicion standard in the following terms:
“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was
in danger.” Id. at 27. The Court also made clear that the reasonable suspicion standard may be met “even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id. at 22.
233. Id. at 24.
234. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
235. Id. at 51.
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vi. Police stopping you at a roadblock for fifteen seconds to ask you questions
A roadblock constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. That is, a
reasonable person subjected to such a roadblock would not feel free to leave. As
a seizure, the roadblock and detention must be reasonable, but what constitutes
reasonableness depends on the purpose of the temporary detention. If a
roadblock is set up in an emergency situation— for example, “to thwart an
imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee
by way of a particular route”236—then “the Fourth Amendment would almost
certainly permit [it].”237 In the absence of such exigent circumstances, however,
a roadblock for ordinary law enforcement purposes—such as attempting to
intercept narcotics traffickers—“can only be justified by some quantum of
individualized suspicion.”238 That quantum of individualized suspicion is
reasonable suspicion.239
However, if the roadblock is set up for a purpose other than the ordinary
needs of law enforcement, such as to ensure road safety240 or to detect
undocumented immigrants,241 then even individualized (i.e., reasonable)
suspicion is not required. Instead, “where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the
Government’s interests.”242 This standard is met by, for example, a fixed
immigration checkpoint roughly in the vicinity of the nation’s border243 and a
sobriety checkpoint at which officers do not have discretion about which
motorists to stop.244 In each of these decisions, the Supreme Court justified
allowing suspicion-less stops on the basis, inter alia, that “the measure of the
intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints . . . is slight.”245
Table 3. Summary of Supreme Court Doctrinal Requirements for Justifying
a Valid Search

Scenario
Roadblock

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Supreme Court Requirement for Valid
Search
Neutral guidelines/criteria
(individualized suspicion not required)

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 47.
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449.
See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543.
See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
Id. at 451.
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Street stop for ID / Pat-down for
weapons

Reasonable suspicion
(individualized)

Search trunk of car

Probable cause
(warrant not required)
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Infrared images of house
Probable cause and a warrant
Search of bedroom
The survey results for many of the individual scenarios conflict with the
Supreme Court’s historical judgments on the same police conduct. This disparity
is apparent when comparing the Supreme Court’s determinations of the
scenarios’ relative intrusiveness with our study’s determinations of the same
scenarios’ relative intrusiveness.
First, the survey participants consider a pat-down for weapons on a public
street to be more intrusive than a search of the trunk of a car on a public street.246
This runs counter to the Supreme Court’s approach. As described in Table 3, a
trunk search requires probable cause,247 whereas a pat-down for weapons
requires only reasonable suspicion. This is likely due to the greater privacy
intrusion (according to the Court) when searching a car trunk than when
conducting a weapons pat-down.248 The results of earlier surveys accord with the
Court’s approach rather than with the results of our survey. In earlier surveys,
respondents viewed the search of a trunk to be a greater privacy intrusion than a
pat-down for weapons.249
Second, the data shows that the survey participants consider many of the
“technology” searches to be more intrusive than other actions that the Supreme
Court has not only held to violate reasonable expectations of privacy, but has
held to involve the greatest violation of reasonable expectations of privacy. This
can be seen from Table 4 below, which combines the survey results in Table 2
with the Supreme Court’s rankings in Table 3. Table 4 also shows whether a
lower court (for scenarios upon which the Supreme Court has not yet ruled) has
held that the described action violates a reasonable expectation of privacy and,
if so, what degree of justification the investigators required in order for the search
to be valid under the Fourth Amendment.

246. See supra Table 1.
247. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may search an automobile
and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is
contained.”).
248. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
and possession of a weapon).
249. See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 738.
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Table 4. Comparison of Respondent Perceptions and Supreme Court
Requirements by Experimental Scenario

Respondents’
Intrusiveness
Rating (avg.)
36.7
49.9
51.7
55.4
63.4
65.7
67.3

Reasonable
expectations of
privacy recognized
in judicial holding?
Yes
?
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
?

68.0

?

Pat-down
Web site operator
Dropped phone
Track Phone
Bedroom search
Email recipients

68.1
68.1
70.5
72.9
73.1
73.8

Yes
No
No
?
Yes
No

Stingray –
location,
messages, calls
Drone – backyard
Cloud

77.0

?

77.5
77.6

?
?

Scenario
Roadblock
Gunshot detection
Street stop for ID
DNA – coffee cup
Infrared images
Trunk of car
E-retail
information
Google maps

Requirements/justification
for valid search
Neutral criteria/guidelines
Not yet determined
Reasonable suspicion
No REP, so no justification
Probable cause and warrant
Probable cause
Suggested by Justice
Sotomayor
Suggested by Justice
Sotomayor
Reasonable suspicion
No REP, so no justification
No REP, so no justification
Circuit split250
Probable cause and warrant
No REP, according to
Circuit Court251
Probable cause and
warrant, according to
District Court252
Not yet determined
Not yet determined253

250. Compare United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that tracking
a criminal suspect for three days using cell tower information did not constitute a search), United States
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding that obtaining cellular location information did not constitute a search), with United States v.
Graham, 796 F. 3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that collecting two weeks of cellular location information
constituted a search).
251. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d. 500, 504 (2008) (“[C]omputer surveillance that enabled
the government to learn the to/from addresses of his e mail messages . . . did not constitute a search. . . .”).
252. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The use of a cell-site
simulator constitutes a . . . search . . . . Absent a search warrant, the Government may not turn a citizen’s
cell phone into a tracking device.”).
253. But see United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 530 (2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (“As
for documents that we store in the Cloud, our privacy interest there is the same as that recognized in
documents and other items maintained in a rented office or residence, or a hotel room during a paid visit.
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Not decided in U.S. v.
Jones254

As we noted above, even the action with the lowest intrusiveness rating—
brief questioning at a roadblock—intrudes upon a person’s reasonable
expectations of privacy, according to Supreme Court precedent.255 In other
words, survey participants consider every one of the “technology searches” to be
more intrusive of privacy than actions that the Court has held does violate
reasonable expectations of privacy. Similarly, survey participants consider all
but one of the technology searches (gunshot detection) to be more intrusive than
being stopped on the street and asked for identification, which the Court has held
is a temporary seizure that requires reasonable suspicion.
This comparison of the survey results also provides further support for the
contention—made by Justice Sotomayor in United States v. Jones and by
numerous scholars—that the Court should not apply the third party doctrine to
technology searches. Two of the questions in the survey were based on scenarios
that Justice Sotomayor pointed out are not violations of reasonable expectations
of privacy at all under the third party doctrine. However, in our study, survey
participants consider these two scenarios—police obtaining information about
your online retail purchases and police obtaining your location information from
Google Maps—to be more intrusive than full-blown searches requiring probable
cause (and, in one case, a warrant).
Additionally, survey participants consider tracking a person’s movements
by using cellular towers to be more intrusive than a physical pat-down, which
the Supreme Court has classified as a search. The former issue is currently
pending before the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States.256 Our data also
suggest that ordinary people view the police’s conduct in this case as violating
their reasonable expectations of privacy, suggesting that it should be classified
as a search.
Finally, survey participants consider five of the technology searches to be
the most intrusive of all the study’s scenarios. All five of these—Stingray
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court has plainly recognized as reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment the privacy interest in effects held in such places . . . The privacy expectation has not
abraded simply because the effect to be searched is virtual and the ‘place’ of storage is now the intangible
Cloud.”).
254. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012) (“We may have to grapple with these
‘vexing problems’ [about when GPS tracking violates reasonable expectations of privacy] in some future
case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there
is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”). But see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d
544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that installation and monitoring of a GPS device constitutes a search);
Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014) (holding that real-time tracking of a suspect using her cell
phone on public roads constitutes a search).
255. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
256. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
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devices, drones, obtaining emails, accessing the Cloud, and GPS tracking—were
considered more intrusive than a police search of one’s bedroom, the
quintessential violation of privacy that requires justification by probable cause
and a warrant. Given the Court’s assertions that the definition of a search reflects
what society considers to be an intrusion into reasonable expectations of privacy,
these five investigative actions should be held to be searches requiring the
presence of probable cause and a search warrant. Interestingly, according to the
data, the most intrusive search of all the scenarios presented was tracking a
vehicle using a GPS device—which is precisely the question the Supreme Court
declined to decide in United States v. Jones.
C. Other Significant Factors
This part discusses race, experience with law enforcement, political
leanings, age, income, and sex as predictors for whether individuals will find
privacy violations. To the extent that the judiciary suffers from these same
demographic associations and is not demographically representative of the
population, these data explain why doctrine may evolve away from the public’s
reasonable expectations of privacy.
1. Race and Experience with Law Enforcement
Using a regression analysis, we analyzed whether participants’ responses
differed based on race. Our primary finding was that those who identified as
White were less sensitive to police conduct than those who identified as African
American. On average, Whites found that 10.7 out of 18 scenarios violated
reasonable expectations of privacy.257 African Americans found violations
12.3% more often, or an average of 2.21 additional scenarios in the slate of 18
(p < .001). Compared to Whites, individuals that identified as “other” race were
13.2% more likely to find a violation (2.38 additional scenarios on average) (p <
.001).
The prior literature suggested that Hispanics’ privacy attitudes might also
differ from Whites’, but we did not see such differences in our results, even
though we had strong statistical power to detect even small effects.258 No other
minorities (American Indians/Alaskan Natives, Asian/Native Hawaiians, or
Other Pacific Islanders) showed statistically significant differences.
Additionally, we found interesting differences with the way experience
with law enforcement affected Whites and African Americans. Whites who had
been the subject of a police search were more sensitive to police conduct.259 But
257. See Race/Experience Model found in Appendix C.
258. In one context, others have reported that Hispanics were “over three times more likely to
believe that a warrant was necessary.” Smith et al., supra note 180, at 137 (for tracking cell phone use
information).
259. We asked participants to check a box if the following statement applied to them: “The police
have NEVER searched me or my property.” In our study, 202 out of 770 White respondents (26.2%)
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the same effect was not seen in African Americans. Specifically, Whites who
said that they had been the subject of a police search found privacy violations
9.2% more often (1.65 additional scenarios on average) than White respondents
who did not have this experience (p < .001), controlling for all other covariates.
In contrast, African Americans who had been the subject of a police search in
the past were not more sensitive to privacy violations than African American
respondents who did not have such an experience. If anything, the data trended
slightly in the opposite direction.260
We also asked participants whether they or their close friends or family
members had been the subject of a police investigation. The results were similar.
When participants or their close friends or family members had been the subject
of a criminal investigation, White respondents found 9.26% (1.67 scenarios)
more violations of privacy than Whites without any of these experiences (p <
.001).261 Not surprisingly, the effect was more pronounced when we focused on
Whites who had been personally the subject of a criminal investigation. They
found 12.5% more scenarios (2.26 scenarios) to violate reasonable expectations
of privacy (p < .001).262 But again, for both these analyses, we did not see similar
results with African Americans. Indeed, our results trended in the opposite
direction, but they were not statistically significant.
These results suggest that one factor affecting privacy views of police
conduct is past experiences with police. But race complicates the story. For
Whites, such individual experiences appear to make them more concerned about
privacy. However, African Americans are already more concerned about police
conduct than their White counterparts. These attitudes may be because the
African American community as a whole has different views of police than
Whites do. It may be that, perhaps because of the higher rate of pat-downs,
arrests, and prison time for African Americans—and the sense that these
experiences with the criminal justice system are in significant part because of
their race—the attitudes resulting from police interaction are promulgated
throughout African American communities.263 That is, it may be that, regardless
of whether African Americans or their friends or family have had direct
experiences with the police, they generally (and understandably) have attitudes
and 49 out of 207 African American respondents (23.6%) did not check a box (i.e., they have been
searched).
260. In other words, African Americans who had personal experiences with police searches were
actually less likely to find that certain scenarios violated reasonable expectations of privacy. Our
regression analysis found that African Americans who had been searched found that the scenarios
violated reasonable expectations of privacy 5.91% less often (1.06 fewer scenarios). But these findings
were not statistically significant (p = .124).
261. Here, 167 out of 770 White respondents (21.7%) and 62 out of 207 African American
respondents (30.0%) reported that they, a close friend, or family member had been the subject of a
criminal investigation within the last ten years.
262. We found that 79 White respodents out of 770 (10.3%) and 17 African Americans out of
207 (8.21%) had been the subject of a criminal investigation in the last ten years.
263. See supra notes 143–47 discussion and sources.

312

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:263

towards the police akin to that of White individuals who have had direct
experiences with the police. While our data is certainly consistent with this
hypothesis, our study cannot explain why experiences with police affect the
privacy views of Whites and African Americans in different ways.
2. Political Leanings
Our analysis of political leanings showed that individuals who prefer
Republicans are less likely to find violations of reasonable expectations of
privacy. We asked participants to place themselves on a seven-tiered scale. One
end was “I strongly prefer the Democrats,” and the other end was “I strongly
prefer the Republicans.” For every step in the conservative direction, participants
found 1.90% (0.34 out of 18 scenarios) fewer violations of reasonable
expectations of privacy (p < .0001). This result suggests that individuals who
strongly prefer Republicans will find that 11.4% less scenarios violate reasonable
expectations of privacy than those who strongly prefer Democrats.
These findings are consistent with those of Fradella et al. and Smith et al.
Fradella found that “Republicans express lower levels of support for the
protection of privacy than Democrats.”264 More narrowly, Smith found that
Democrats were more likely to expect privacy for cell phone data.265 Conversely,
Kugler and Strahilevitz did not find that political orientation affected people’s
view on GPS surveillance, while Scott-Hayward et al. found that independents
had higher expectations of privacy for location information than either
Republicans or Democrats. 266
3. Age
We found that an individual’s age also had some ability to explain a
person’s privacy views. A standard linear regression failed to yield statistically
significant results. However, modeling age using a quadratic function (i.e.,
similar to a parabola) was consistent with the results of our survey (p < .05).267
This model predicts that participants at the middle of our age range will find
more violations of privacy than both younger and older people.
Figure 2 depicts our age model and gives an intuitive sense of these
findings. The model predicts that people at forty-one years old find the most
violations of privacy; they found that 65.6% more scenarios violated reasonable
expectations of privacy (11.8 out of 18 scenarios). However, both younger and
older people were less concerned about privacy. Our model predicts that our

264. Fradella et al., supra note 173, at 368.
265. Smith et al., supra note 180, at 138.
266. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 255; Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 176, at 58.
267. See Appendix C, Table C2 Age Model. At first, we tried modeling age using a linear
function. Examination of a residual plot from that model suggested that expectations of privacy were
higher for those in the middle age range. Accordingly, we used a quadratic function to model the data
and that was a better fit.
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youngest population will find a very small reduction in the number of scenarios
that violate reasonable expectations privacy. Individuals eighteen years of age
are predicted to find that 4.5% fewer scenarios (.81 out of 18 scenarios) violate
reasonable expectations of privacy. However, our model shows slightly larger
effects as people age. For example, seventy-year-olds are predicted to find that
7.2% (1.3 out of 18 scenarios) fewer scenarios violate reasonable expectations
of privacy.268
Figure 2. Average Number of Scenarios Found to Violate Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy as a Quadratic Function of Age

Kugler and Strahilevitz also found modest age affects. They noted that
those with the lowest privacy expectations in the geolocation context were
significantly older than other groups (6.42 years older).269 It is unclear whether
we can reconcile these different studies using a parabolic model like the one we
use above.
As a point of reference, consider that fifty is the average age at which U.S.
federal magistrate judges are appointed.270 These judges are often tasked with
resolving procedural questions, including motions to suppress evidence in

268. The sparseness of the points in the higher age range reflects the absence of participants in
certain ages.
269. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 252.
270. See Appointments of Magistrate Judges—Judicial Business 2012, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/appointments-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2012
[https://perma.cc/3FER-5PTB].
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criminal cases. Most states have mandatory retirement ages.271 Federal judges,
of course, have life tenure and other incentives to continue on the bench in
“senior status,” which skews the judiciary’s age upwards.272 It is thus
unsurprising that judicial doctrine skews away from the perceptions of a younger
population.
4. Income
We also found that an individual’s income had some ability to explain a
person’s privacy views. Again, a standard linear regression failed to yield
statistically significant results. However, modeling income using a quadratic
function was more consistent with our survey results (p < .05).273 This model
predicts that participants at the middle-income range will find fewer violations
of privacy than both poorer and wealthier people.
Figure 3. Average Number of Scenarios Found to Violate Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy as a Quadratic Function of Income

271. See Arizona Proposition 115: What Courts/States Have Mandatory Judicial Retirement and
at What Age?, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 12, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2012/10/11/arizonaproposition-115-what-courtsstates-have-mandatory-judicial-retirement-and-at-what-age
[https://perma.cc/84NG-432M] (noting that thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have age
limits for at least some of their judges).
272. See generally Life Tenure for Federal Judges Raises Issues of Senility, Dementia, PRO
PUBLICA (Jan. 11, 2012, 7:30 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/life-tenure-for-federal-judgesraises-issues-of-senility-dementia [https://perma.cc/VU4T-NW84].
273. See Appendix C, Table C2 Income Model.
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Figure 3 depicts our income model. Our model predicts that people with
incomes between $60,000 and $89,999 will consider 11.2 of our 18 scenarios
(62.2%) to violate reasonable expectations of privacy. However, as income
diminishes to less than $10,000 (zero on our income scale), our model suggests
that such individuals will find 7.2% (1.3 out of 18 scenarios) more of our
scenarios to violate reasonable expectations or privacy. To a lesser extent, the
same is true for individuals who are higher on the income ladder. Figure 3 shows
that our model predicts that individuals that earn over $200,000 (12 on our
income scale) will find 3.9% more scenarios (.7 out of 18 scenarios) violate their
expectations of privacy.
Smith et al. found that lower income respondents were more likely to
believe that an individual had an expectation of privacy in relation to data stored
on their cell phones.274 It is unclear whether these results are consistent with our
parabolic model.
5. Sex
Men were generally more likely to find privacy violations than women, in
a substantial effect with size comparable to that of being African American or
viewing the case in the first person perspective.275 We also examined gender
interactions with every individual scenario, and identified one contrary scenario
– the body pat-down – in which women were more likely to find privacy
violations.276 As noted above, women tend to be underrepresented in the state
and federal judiciary.277 Thus, if judges also suffer from these sex-associated
attitudes, doctrine may be biased towards privacy generally but against privacy
findings in body pat-down situations.
V.
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Limitations
Our study had several methodological limitations. Before reviewing those,
it is important to acknowledge our conceptual focus on the threshold question of
whether police conduct constitutes a search or seizure. Our study does not
directly address the question of whether a search or seizure is ultimately
reasonable, a distinct question under Supreme Court doctrine (even though it also
turns on a conception of reasonableness).
274. Smith et al., supra note 180, at 138.
275. See Appendix C, Table C1 (showing that the odds of men finding privacy violations were
1.474 times that of women (p = 0.0008), compared to African Americans (1.639) or those in First Person
condition (1.429)).
276. See id. (showing odds of 1.729 (p =0.0004)).
277. See supra notes 147–149 discussion.
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First, we used short and very abridged statements for our experimental
stimulus, providing respondents with less contextual information than judges
have when they decide analogous questions in a litigated case. The condensed
stimulus allowed us to utilize a randomized, controlled, and experimental design,
which is the gold standard for scientific research, and allowed us to study a wide
range of scenarios. These focused vignettes also allowed us to avoid other
extraneous and potentially biasing information (e.g., the suspect’s race or the
particular crime under investigation), which could confound our results.
Nonetheless, it is possible that respondents would have different views about the
scenarios and the biases we observed could have different magnitudes, if we
introduced additional information. Because we did not specify these other
variables, respondents may have made their own assumptions, which we do not
observe.
Second, we did not study the actual judges who make judicial decisions.
For the purposes of determining whether these police practices do violate
reasonable expectations of privacy, we argued in Section II.Dabove that the legal
doctrine actually requires such an inquiry into the perceptions of ordinary
Americans. However, we also use our data to critique current judicial practice.
Our data show that cognitive bias infects privacy assessments when decided from
hindsight and from the third-person perspectives which judges presently employ.
It would take an inferential step from the biases documented in our sample to the
population of judges for this to suggest a problem in our current judicial practice.
Prior work with actual judges makes this inference quite reasonable.278 It is
possible, nonetheless, that judges are not subject to the same cognitive biases as
other humans are.279
Third, although we took care to recruit a sample that represented certain
U.S. demographic profiles based on the U.S. Census and further reweighted the
sample to approximate the U.S. population, we did not use a true probability
sample (such as random digit dialing). In particular, it is likely that our online
sample includes more active Internet users than the U.S. population at large, and
this may affect their perceptions of police practices involving technology.
Fourth, although we can infer causation from our randomly-assigned
variables (hindsight and third person biases), which hold constant all observable
and non-observable differences, we can only speak in terms of association for
the naturally-occurring variables (such as respondent demographics). For the
latter associations that we observe, we use multivariate regressions to adjust for
other observed covariates, but we cannot rule out the possibility that nonobserved variables cause these associations. For example, although we see
females are more privacy protective in the domain of body pat-downs, it may be
that victims of sexual assault are more sensitive, and this non-observed

278.
279.

See supra notes 114, 117.
See supra notes 118–30 and accompanying text.
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characteristic is more common among females. This is a standard limitation of
cross-sectional research.
B. Policy Recommendations
We have five primary findings relevant to policy. First and most
importantly, generally members of the U.S. public have greater concerns for
privacy than are reflected in current judicial doctrine. Second, current judicial
doctrine includes several relative judgments—e.g., giving no protection to
emails held by an internet provider, but the strongest available Fourth
Amendment protection to a bedroom—that do not reflect actual expectations of
privacy in the United States. Third, the ubiquitous practice of judgment in
hindsight (i.e., with knowledge that the search has found evidence of crime)
strongly decreases the likelihood that participants would find violations of
reasonable expectations of privacy. Fourth, the ubiquitous practice of developing
Fourth Amendment doctrine by resolving criminal defendants’ suppression
motions (in the third person) also decreases the likelihood of finding a violation.
Fifth, Whites and older persons (beyond age forty-one)—i.e., those who
dominate the judiciary—are less likely to find that police investigative practices
invade privacy.
In principle, the five distinct findings could yield as many, or more, policy
reform recommendations. For example, first, to address our race findings, we
recommend reform of the judiciary so that the population of judges deciding
Fourth Amendment questions might reflect the demographics of the U.S.
population at large (if not the population of those most often subject to police
investigations). Especially in state courts, judges are currently disproportionately
White, which means that they are likely biased against finding police privacy
violations, compared to the perceptions of the broader U.S. population. On the
other hand, states are ahead of the federal judiciary in imposing mandatory
retirement ages, which should mitigate the age-related biases that we document.
Second, to address the conflict between current judicial doctrine and the actual
expectations of privacy held by ordinary citizens, we recommend that the
Supreme Court should hold that the third party doctrine does not apply to
searches involving digital technology.280
280. The Supreme Court is grappling with this very issue now in Carpenter v. United States. See
supra note 256 and accompanying text. Moreover, two district courts reached different conclusions
about whether the third party doctrine allows the National Security Agency to make a daily warrantless
sweep of the public’s metadata pursuant to an earlier incarnation of the Foreign Intelligence and
Surveillance Act. Compare Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding government
collection of telephony metadata constitutes a search), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C.
Cir. 2015), with ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (finding government collection
of telephony metadata does not constitute a search because the third party doctrine applies), rev’d on
other grounds, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). The courts could also use the same kind of data for other
issues that they are facing now. For example, applying the private search doctrine to different types of
digital information has produced inconsistent results. There is currently a circuit split as to the proper
application of the doctrine to computers and digital storage devices. See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman,
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More generally, we recommend a solution for all five problems. If courts
would rely on properly-constructed surveys to assess whether particular conduct
violates reasonable expectations of privacy, then they could avoid the difficulties
of speculating from their own racialized perspective in hindsight and in the third
person. When the survey stimulus materials are properly constructed, this
proposal has the benefit of eliminating both hindsight bias and third person bias.
If the sample is constructed (or reweighted) to reflect the demographics of the
U.S. population, then race and age biases can be resolved as well. Finally, this
approach substitutes reliable evidence for judicial speculation, aligning judicial
doctrine about privacy with the actual views of the public that is to be governed
by that doctrine.281 It is worth emphasizing that judicial use of reliable empirical
evidence does not involve a departure from the current doctrinal approach, and
therefore it requires no additional normative justification. As we described in
detail in Section I.D, the courts already peg the definitions of searches and
seizures to ordinary beliefs; they just do so while relying on their personal
speculation and intuitions about what those ordinary beliefs are, instead of
accurate and reliable empirical data.282 On the other hand, science is no
panacea—it must be done well, be free of bias, and be interpreted properly.283
831 F.3d 1292, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding government investigators conducted an illegal search
when they opened files not previously viewed by a third party); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d
478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding police conducted an illegal search when they viewed files on a device
in addition to the files previously viewed by a private party); United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323,
1335 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding police conducted an illegal search when they viewed images and videos
on a storage device in addition to the files on the device that were previously viewed by a third party);
Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding police did not conduct a search when a
private party had viewed some files on a zip drive, even though the police opened and viewed additional
files on the zip drive that the private party had not viewed); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that police did not conduct a search when a private party had viewed some files
on CDs, even though the police opened and viewed additional files on the CDs that private party had
not viewed).
281. In principle, aligning judicial doctrine with actual views of privacy could involve either
increasing Fourth Amendment protections, where actual views of privacy are stronger than the Supreme
Court’s historical judgments, or decreasing Fourth Amendment protections, where actual views of
privacy are weaker than the Court’s judgments. However, at least with respect to the scenarios we tested,
the results indicated that actual views of privacy were either stronger than, or consistent with, the Court’s
doctrinal judgments. Even the scenario that had the lowest intrusiveness responses among those we
tested—the police roadblock—was considered a privacy intrusion by more than one-quarter of the
survey respondents. See supra Section IV.B. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that a
police roadblock is a Fourth Amendment seizure, but one involving a relatively minor intrusion on the
motorist and consequently requiring a relatively minor justification. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding that sobriety checkpoints intrude upon a motorists’ privacy, but are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of individualized suspicion provided that
they are administered according to non-discretionary procedures).
282. It is also worth noting that, in utilizing empirical data on reasonable expectations of privacy,
the courts are not ceding their ultimate judgment on whether law enforcement practices violate the
Fourth Amendment. The courts would still, inter alia, decide whether or not law enforcement practices
considered intrusive by ordinary citizens are reasonable and therefore permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.
283. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed.
2011) (guiding judges on how to interpret scientific evidence and survey data in particular); Christopher
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CONCLUSION
Our experiment replicated some of the best features from prior work and
improved on them in several ways. First, we started with a large (1,200
participants) and demographically diverse sample. Instead of drawing
participants to mirror the U.S. population, we intentionally oversampled
minorities, which allowed statistically reliable estimates for their distinctive
perceptions of privacy. This is important because police investigations tend to
fall disproportionately on these populations. Nonetheless, we also reweighted
our sample to reflect the U.S. Census, allowing accurate society-wide estimates.
We tested a mix of long-established police activities and cutting-edge
technological investigative techniques. Finally, we replicated and improved on
prior studies of third-person and hindsight biases.
Together, our findings suggest that judicial speculation is a poor substitute
for evidence. If the judiciary continues to craft doctrine about police invasions
of privacy that is untethered to the actual expectations of the populace, it risks a
crisis of legitimacy for both the police and the judiciary.
APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS
Respondents received the following instructions, with manipulations by
experimental condition shown.
Instructions: 1st Person/No Evidence of Crime.
The purpose of this study is to examine people’s attitudes on various types
of police actions. Below are 18 scenarios involving police actions. Assume in
each case that the police are looking for evidence of criminal activity and that:
(1) you have not engaged in criminal activity—that is, you are
innocent of any criminal wrongdoing—and are not planning
any crime;
(2) you are presumed innocent of any criminal wrongdoing; and
(3) you have not consented to the police action.
Please rate each scenario in terms of “intrusiveness” that is, how
intrusive you think each police action is, using a scale of 1 to 100.
“1” means not intrusive at all, and “100” means extremely intrusive,
while a “50” means moderately intrusive, and so on.
Then please tell us whether you believe that the actions described
in the scenario would violate your reasonable expectations of
privacy.
Instructions: 1st Person/Evidence of Crime: Substitute instruction 1 below.
(1) the police found evidence of criminal activity by you, but
Instructions: 3rd Person/No Evidence of Crime

Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2010) (discussing partisan bias in expert
testimony and solutions to the problem).
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The purpose of this study is to examine people’s attitudes on various types
of police actions. Below are 18 scenarios involving police actions. Assume in
each case that the police are looking for evidence of criminal activity and that:
(1) the target of the actions has not engaged in criminal activity—
that is, the person is innocent of any criminal wrongdoing—
and is not planning any crime;
(2) the person is presumed innocent of any criminal wrongdoing;
and
(3) the person did not consent to the police action.
Please rate each scenario in terms of “intrusiveness” that is, how
intrusive you think each police action is, using a scale of 1 to 100.
“1” means not intrusive at all, and “100” means extremely intrusive,
while a “50” means moderately intrusive, and so on.
Then, please tell us whether you believe that the actions described
in the scenario would violate your reasonable expectations of
privacy.
Instructions: 3rd Person/Evidence of Crime: Substitute instruction 1 below.
(1) the police found evidence of criminal activity by a person, but
APPENDIX B. DEMOGRAPHICS AND REWEIGHTING
Table B displays demographics and successful random assignment. The
furthest right-hand column shows our targets for reweighting responses. The
footnotes for this table indicate the source of the U.S. population demographics
found in the right-hand column
Table B. Demographics of Respondents by Experimental Condition and
U.S. Population
U.S.
No Evidence
Evidence of Crime
Population
1st
3rd
1st
3rd
Person
Person
Person
Person
(n = 301)
(n = 300)
(n = 301) (n = 298)
Sex284
Female
59.5%
56.9%
62.5%
59.1%
50.8%
Male
40.5%
43.1%
37.5%
40.9%
49.2%
Age285
18-34
47.2%
49.2%
49.5%
50.7%
30.6%
35-49
32.9%
33.7%
30.6%
35.9%
27.2%

284. U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/4Z98-2TDB].
285. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010 (2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5JQ-RALK].

2018]

WHY COURTS FAIL TO PROTECT PRIVACY

50-64
Over 65
Ethnicity286
White
African American
Native American
Asian
Pacific Islander
Other
Hispanic287
Non-Hispanic
Mexican origin
Puerto
Rican origin
Cuban origin
Other
Education288
Some School
Graduated
High School
Some College
Associate’s
Degree
Bachelor’s
Degree
Master’s Degree
Professional
Degree
PhD
Income289
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17.6%
2.3%

12.1%
5.1%

16.6%
3.3%

10.7%
2.7%

25.1%
17.2%

63.8%
17.9%
3.3%
7.6%
0.3%
7%

64.3%
14.5%
3.7%
7.7%
1.3%
8.4%

67.8%
16.6%
2.0%
8.0%
0.3%
5.3%

60.7%
20.1%
1.3%
9.7%
0.7%
7.4%

72.4 %
12.6%
0.9%
4.8%
0.2%
9.1%

79.4%
11.6%

78.8%
11.1%

79.1%
13.3%

75.2%
14.8%

83.7%
10.3%

2.7%
1.0%
5.3%

3.4%
1.7%
5.1%

4.3%
0.7%
2.7%

3.4%
1.0%
5.7%

1.5%
0.6%
4.2%

3.7%

1.7%

1.7%

3.0%

13.7%

17.9%
26.6%

20.5%
25.6%

20.9%
22.6%

22.8%
27.2%

31.0%
19.3%
8.6%

14.0%

12.5%

12.6%

12.8%

25.2%
9.3%

25.3%
10.1%

32.2%
6.3%

23.2%
6.4%

6.7%

2.3%
1.0%

3.4%
1.0%

1.3%
2.3%

3.7%
1.0%

1.4%
1.2%

18.0%

286. See id.
287. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010 (2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WWN-7U9L].
288. See tables hyperlinked at Educational Attainment in the United States: 2010, U.S CENSUS
BUREAU (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2010/demo/educational-attainment/cpsdetailed-tables.html [https://perma.cc/UL47-PPQS].
289. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME
AND
POVERTY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES:
2014
(2015),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6P66-E3WR].
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Under $50,000
Over $50,000
Politics290
Democrat
Leans Democrat
Independent
Leans Republican
Republican
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48.5%
51.5%

44.8%
55.2%

45.5%
54.5%

47.7%
52.3%

46.8 %
53.2%

37.5%
18.6%
20.3%
8%
15.6%

34.7%
16.8%
19.2%
12.8%
16.5%

37.5%
12.6%
22.3%
12%
15.6%

40.6%
14.8%
19.8%
8.7%
16.1%

30%291
18%
1.0%
14.0%
27.0%292

APPENDIX C. REGRESSION MODELS
Table C1 shows the results of a regression analysis to find the odds ratio
for variables of interest. The (Intercept) value corresponds to the odds of a
violation in the reference case of a roadblock when all demographic and
experimental variables are zero. Coefficients for values of categorical variables
detailing the situation show the odds ratio if the situation in the case is changed
to the given situation from the roadblock, but all else is unchanged. The ethnicity
odds ratios are given relative to the category of “White.” The odds ratios for the
binary variables show the results of changing the binary variable for Outcome
from evidence of a crime to no crime, changing sex from Female to Male,
changing from third person to first person, and changing each of the binary
variables Hispanic, Searched, and Investigated Family from false to true.
Coefficients for values of ordered variables show the odds ratio if the ordered
variable is increased by one level, but all else is unchanged. The Pat-down
Female coefficient is an interaction variable. The age effect is better fit by a
quadratic, making the one year change uninformative.
Table C1. Regression Model with Individual Scenarios and Covariates

(Intercept)

0.0000

Odds
Ratio
0.123

Trunk

0.0000

11.817

GPS

0.0000

40.698

Bedroom

0.0000

19.758

ID

0.0000

3.461

Pat-down

0.0000

9.205

Variable

p value

290. Party Affiliation, GALLUP NEWS, http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/79HK-TMLQ] (source at “2016 Jun 1–5”).
291. Matching both prefer and strongly prefer Democrats.
292. Matching both prefer and strongly prefer Republicans.
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Track Phone

0.0000

19.389

Infrared Photos

0.0000

9.093

Web

0.0000

13.155

Cloud

0.0000

38.784

Email

0.0000

27.342

E Retail

0.0000

11.429

Dropped Phone

0.0000

17.560

Gunshot

0.0122

1.319

DNA

0.0000

4.336

Stingray

0.0000

33.997

Drone

0.0000

37.875

Google Maps

0.0000

12.786

Male

0.0008

1.474

Pat-down Female

0.0004

1.729

Age
Age Quadratic

0.6463
0.0317

1.002
0.999

African American

0.0016

1.639

Ethnic–Other

0.0165

1.417

Hispanic

0.2704

1.163

Education

0.1854

0.946

No Evidence of
Crime
Conservative

0.5459

0.989

0.0001

0.886

No Outcome

0.0000

2.439

1st Person

0.0010

1.429

Searched

0.1271

1.236

Investigated Family

0.0058

1.497

323

Table C.2. Regression Models to Isolate Significant Predictors
Variable
No Evidence of Crime
1st Person
Gender
Age
Age–Quadratic
Education
Income

Race/Search

Politics

Age

Income

-.0022
-.0015*
-.062

All Model
2.28***
.85**
.88**
.0051
-.0015*
-.14
-.033

324
Income–Quadratic
Hispanic
Conservative
Searched
African American
American Indian
Asian
Pacific Islander
Other Race
Searched
African American
Searched
American Indian
Searched Asian
Searched
Pacific Islander
Searched Race Other
Intercept
Multiple R2
Adjusted R2
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.027*

1.65***
2.21***
1.46
.37
3.13
2.38***
-2.71**

.025*
.21
-.28***
1.25**
1.96***
.49
.47
3.16
2.05**
-2.67**

-.77

-.058

.57
-1.11

-.27
-.45

-1.74
10.67***
.04102

12.38***
.01651

11.64***
.0041

11.89***
.005577

-1.88
10.21***
.1307

0.03214

.01569

0.002469

.003915

.1152

-.34***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
The dependent variable reflects how many of the eighteen scenarios the
subject found violated reasonable expectations of privacy.
In the Race/Search regression model, we start with a white respondent who
has not been the is 21.5-11.48(Income)+Income2.
In the “all” model, we start with a non-Hispanic white female, where the
question is framed in the third person with knowledge of the outcome (evidence
of a crime). The person has not been the subject police investigation and the
person’s family and close friends have not been the subject of a police
investigation. Age is as above. Income is on a 0-12 scale, ranging from less than
$10,000 to $200,000 or more. Education is on 2-8 scale, ranging from high
school graduate to holder of a professional degree or doctorate. Political
affiliation ranges from 0 = strongly prefer Democrats to 6 = strongly prefer
Republicans.

